Eds: This story was supplied by
The Conversationfor AP customers. The Associated Press does not guarantee the content.
(THE CONVERSATION) Since
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church has defended Russia’s actions and blamed the conflict
on the West.
Patriarch Kirill’s support for the invasion of a country where millions of people belong to his own church has led critics to conclude that Orthodox leadership has become little more than an arm of the state – and that this is the role it usually plays.
The reality is much more complicated. The relationship between Russian church and state has undergone
profound historical transformations, not least in the past century – a focus of my work as
a scholar of Eastern Orthodoxy. The church’s current support for the Kremlin is not inevitable or predestined, but a deliberate decision that needs to be understood.
For centuries, leaders in Byzantium and Russia prized the idea of church and state
working harmoniously together in “symphony” – unlike their more competitive relationships in some Western countries.
In the early 1700s, however, Czar Peter the Great instituted reforms for greater control of the church – part of
his attempts to make Russia more like Protestant Europe.
Churchmen grew to resent the state’s interference. They did not defend the monarchy in its final hour during
the February Revolution of 1917, hoping it would lead to a “free church in a free state.”
The Bolsheviks who seized power, however, embraced
a militant atheismthat sought to secularize society completely. They regarded the church as a threat because of its ties to the old regime.
Attacks on the churchproceeded from legal measures like confiscating property to executing clergy suspected of supporting the counterrevolution.
Patriarch Tikhon, head of the Church during the Revolution, criticized Bolshevik assaults on the Church, but his successor, Metropolitan Bishop Sergy, made
a declaration of loyaltyto the Soviet Union in 1927. Persecution of religion only intensified, however, with repression reaching a peak during the Great Terror of 1937-1938, when
tens of thousandsof clergy and ordinary believers were simply executed or sent to the Gulag. By the end of the 1930s, the Russian Orthodox Church had nearly been destroyed.
The Nazi invasion brought a dramatic reversal. Josef Stalin needed popular support to defeat Germany and
allowed churches to reopen. But his successor, Nikita Khrushchev,
reinvigorated the anti-religious campaignat the end of the 1950s, and for the rest of the Soviet period, the church was tightly controlled and marginalized.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought yet another complete reversal. The church was suddenly free, yet facing enormous challenges after decades of suppression. With the collapse of Soviet ideology, Russian society
seemed set adrift. Church leaders sought to reclaim it, but faced stiff competition from new forces, especially Western consumer culture and American
The first post-Soviet head of the church, Patriarch Aleksy II, maintained his distance from politicians. Initially, they were not very responsive to the church’s goals – including Vladimir Putin in his first two terms between 2000 and 2008. Yet in more recent years, the president has
embraced Russian Orthodoxyas a cornerstone of post-Soviet identity, and relations between church and state leadership have changed significantly since Kirill became patriarch in 2009. He quickly
succeeded in securingthe
return of church propertyfrom the state, religious instruction in public schools and military chaplains in the armed forces.
Kirill has also promoted an influential critique of Western liberalism, consumerism and individualism, contrasted with Russian “
traditional values.” This idea argues that
human rightsare not universal, but a product of Western culture, especially when extended to LGBTQ people. The patriarch also helped develop the idea of the “
Russian world”: a soft power ideology that promotes Russian civilization, ties to Russian-speakers around the world, and greater Russian influence on Ukraine and Belarus.
Although 70%-75% of Russians consider themselves Orthodox,
only a small percentageare active in church life. Kirill has sought to “re-church” society by asserting that Russian Orthodoxy is central to Russian identity, patriotism and cohesion – and a strong Russian state. He has also created a
highly centralized churchbureaucracy that mirrors Putin’s and stifles dissenting voices.
A key turning point came in 2011-2012, starting with massive protests against electoral fraud and Putin’s decision to run for a third term.
initially calledfor the government to dialogue with protesters, but later offered unqualified support for Putin and referred to stability and prosperity during his first two terms as a “
miracle of God,” in contrast to the tumultuous 1990s.
In 2012, Pussy Riot, a feminist punk group,
staged a protestin a Moscow cathedral to criticize Kirill’s support for Putin – yet the episode actually pushed church and state closer together. Putin portrayed Pussy Riot and the opposition as aligned with decadent Western values, and himself as
the defender of Russian morality, including Orthodoxy.
A 2013 lawbanning dissemination of gay “propaganda” to minors, which was supported by the church, was part of this campaign to marginalize dissent.
Putin successfully won reelection, and Kirill’s ideology has been
linked to Putin’sever since.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the eruption of conflict in the Donbas in 2014 also had an enormous impact on the Russian Orthodox Church.
Ukraine’s Orthodox churches remained under the Moscow Patriarchate’s authority after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, about 30% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes
were actually in Ukraine.
The conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, however, intensified Ukrainians’ calls for an independent Orthodox church. Patriarch Bartholomew, the spiritual head of Orthodox Christianity, granted that independence
in 2019. Moscow not only refused to recognize the new church, but also
severed relations with Constantinople, threatening a broader schism.
Orthodox Christians in Ukraine
were divided over which church to follow,deepening Russia’s cultural anxieties about “losing” Ukraine to the West.
Kirill’s close alliance with the Putin regime has had some clear payoffs. Orthodoxy has become one of the
central pillarsof Putin’s image of national identity. Moreover, the “culture wars” discourse of “traditional values” has attracted
international supporters, including
conservative evangelicalsin the United States.
But Kirill does not represent the entirety of the Russian Orthodox Church any more than Putin represents the entirety of Russia. The patriarch’s positions have alienated
some of his own flock, and his support for the invasion of Ukraine will likely split some of his support
Christian leadersaround the world are calling upon Kirill to
pressurethe government to stop the war.
The patriarch has
alienated the Ukrainian flockthat remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate.
Leaders of that churchhave
condemned Russia’s attackand appealed to Kirill to intervene with Putin.
A broader rift is clearly brewing: A number of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops have already
stopped commemorating Kirillduring their services. If Kirill supported Russia’s actions as a way to preserve the unity of the church, the opposite outcome seems likely.
The Conversationis an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts. The Conversation is wholly responsible for the content.