One Failure After Another

Every time there is a failure in Israel, the same reports and findings of investigations are repeated.

When you read the Health Ministry's report about the circumstances in which Teva chairman Eli Hurvitz died in the hospital, you get that feeling of deja vu; that you already read exactly the same thing in the State Comptroller's report about the Carmel blaze tragedy. The findings are also similar to those of the Turkel committee that looked into the way the Turkish flotilla to Gaza was stopped, which are surprisingly reminiscent of the results of the investigation into the kidnapping of IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser in the north. And so on, and so forth.

In all the reports and findings of these examinations and investigations, plus a great many more about all kinds of unrelated mishaps and failures in various and strange systems in the State of Israel, the same findings are repeated time and time again.

1 ) Even though there were discussions, meetings, warnings and decisions about what was likely to happen, the system did not prepare itself for the expected scenario. Thus, those involved did not have with them, in real time, the tools required to deal with what was happening that should have and could have prevented the unfortunate results. Or alternatively, despite the expected scenario, for some strange reason, no discussion was ever held, at any level, about how to deal with it.

2 ) The decision to acquire and install the necessary equipment that could have prevented what happened, or to deal with things at the time of their inception, was not put into effect - either for financial reasons, security needs, lack of a permit, failure to remember, insufficient skills, negligence and/or stupidity. Or alternatively, the equipment was acquired but was left in a storeroom. Or yet another alternative, the equipment was acquired and even installed, but in the wrong place.

3 ) For the same reasons mentioned above - money, security, permits, memory loss, and so forth - no vital intelligence information was collected that could have prevented what happened or its results. Or alternatively, the information was collected but not transferred to Assaf but instead to Sharon, who happened to be pregnant just then and so the information did not reach Zvika.

4 ) During the event itself, the various units responsible for dealing with the event in their region or their platoon acted with a perfect lack of coordination; hence, none of the units knew which other units were active in the area, what they knew or what they were doing. Or alternatively, a considerable number of the units active in the area did not know that the other units existed at all. Another alternative: In some cases coordination was not possible because the necessary equipment had been acquired, but was left in the storeroom because Sharon was pregnant, for reasons of security or savings, and/or because Assaf did not attend the brita of Zvika's daughter and so they were not on speaking terms.

5 ) The person at the head of the system who was supposed to take charge of the whole business did not have a clue about what was happening under his nose, behind him, or on any side of him. That was because: a ) he was simply an idiot; b ) he had just gone abroad to study how to deal with cases like this, and it took place while he was away; c )he was busy sexually molesting the women in his charge; d )no one told him that something was happening; e )he was busy dancing on the table at Zvika's brita and couldn't hear the telephone because of the music; f ) he was too busy trying to solve the problem so didn't notice there was a problem; g ) all of the above.

So really, instead of holding an investigation every time there is the same failure, and instead of reaching the same results, why don't we - once and for all - simply investigate why it is that we are like this? Why?

And in the end, don't forget to throw the findings into the waste paper basket like we always do. Yalla, have a good time!