For All His Flaws, Israel Is Poorer Without Leaders Like Ariel Sharon

Throughout his military career – from commander of the Unit 101 commando platoon to Defense Minister – Ariel Sharon personified, more than anyone else, Israeli aggressiveness and bullying. From the Qibya action in Jordan (when, in 1953, 69 men, women and children were killed by Unit 101 in a reprisal attack) and the battle for Mitla Pass during the Sinai Campaign of 1956, to the conquest of Beirut in the first Lebanon war, Sharon repeatedly led his troops into controversial and blood-soaked operations.

His bravado contributed to building the fighting spirit of the Israel Defense Forces, culminating in the crossing of the Suez Canal that tipped the scales in the Yom Kippur War, in October 1973. Less than a decade later, he was banished from the Defense Ministry, in wake of the Kahan Commission report on the Sabra and Chatila massacre of September 1982. In his achievements, as well as his failures, Sharon was always his own boss, scorning his superiors and lying in his reports.

Aggressiveness, hatred of Arabs and contempt for politicians also characterized Sharon during his political career, which began with his successful initiative of establishing the Likud party in 1973. He was the patron of the settlers and filled the West Bank and Gaza Strip with dozens of unnecessary, harmful settlements. He opposed all the peace accords signed by Israel with its neighbors.

His visit to Jerusalem’s Temple Mount in the summer of 2000 was the spark that ignited the second intifada. Even during the twilight of his career, he continued preaching what he had heard from his mother: “Don’t believe the Arabs.”

But the moment he fulfilled his dream and was elected prime minister, his approach changed. With supreme responsibility thrust on his shoulders, he remained within the bounds of power. He regarded it as a matter of top importance to ensure U.S. support of Israel, and avoided taking any action that could put it at risk.

In contrast with his reckless image of the past, while in power he made decisions slowly and carefully, and carried them out only after making sure he had public support and Washington’s backing. That was the reason for his delay in launching Operation Defensive Shield in many West Bank cities in April 2002, to stop the wave of suicide attacks; consenting to building the West Bank separation barrier, in contrast to his previous stance; evacuating the settlers from the Gaza Strip during the 2005 disengagement; refraining from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities; and preferring clandestine counterterrorism operations by the Mossad. The evacuation of the Gush Katif settlement bloc, which became his political legacy, set an important precedent and showed that the settlements aren’t eternal.

Sharon’s successors as prime minister, Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu, diverged from the line he set. Olmert started an unnecessary war in Lebanon and a destructive military operation in Gaza. Netanyahu exhibited restraint in the use of the army but ruined relations with the U.S. administration. Since Sharon’s departure, Israel has lacked leadership that acknowledges the limits of power, maintains its alliance with the United States, displays political courage in the territories and won’t be deterred by the settlers.