The U.S. President's opening positions become more flexible the closer we come to a deal, while Netanyahu is adopting the tried-and-tested Israeli method: the hell with strategy and long live tactics.
Amir Oren, Senior correspondent and columnist
Amir Oren is a senior correspondent and columnist for Haaretz and a member of the newspaper's editorial board. He writes about defense and military affairs, the government and international relations.
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