Dr. Avner Cohen is Professor of Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS) and a Global Fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC where he is editor of the Digital Archive's 1967 War Collection. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war. He is the author of among other books Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press, 1998) and The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University Press, 2010).
Kennedy's ultimatum, Ben-Gurion's 'sick' reply and a 'fiasco' nuclear inspection: Newly declassified documents shed light on the diplomatic crisis that some feared may lead to a U.S. raid on Israel's Dimona plant
Today, almost 50 years after the original Richard Nixon-Golda Meir understandings, Israel’s nuclear capability – declared or not – is a solid fact recognized by all
Iran has so far decided not to develop a nuclear bomb, but the American threats could now convince it that it has no choice
Netanyahu’s arrogant theatricals exposed Israel's lack of current incriminating evidence on Iran – and Israel's hypocrisy about its own nuclear capabilities
Israelis' reaction to the Syria strike shows they only understand the use of force for their own sake and not as a tool to enforce norms and international order
The time has come for Israel to handle its most open secret differently
The debate about the number of submarines Israel needs is essentially a debate about existential deterrence – just the sort of sensitive issue that must be properly regulated and 'normalized' by law
Only an understanding of the Egyptian viewpoint can reveal to what extent fear of Israel’s nuclear option triggered the 1967 conflict
Could Israel really have detonated a nuclear device on the eve of the Six Day War? The lead researcher for this explosive contention describes exposing what's still Israel’s biggest taboo: its nuclear capabilities
President-elect Donald Trump’s tweets not only breach a sacred U.S. presidential taboo; they are also likely to usher in an era of uncertainty and fear not seen since World War II.
More than half a century after Nyman Levin's heart attack at 10 Downing Street, the British government is fighting tooth and nail to prevent the exposure of the scandal
Of the three main secret organizations under the prime minister’s authority, the IAEC is the most secretive. This harms democratic rule and grants unqualified authority to the executive branch.
Vanunu acted out of the same motive as America's whistle-blower, but was decades ahead of his time.
The removal of the 'Iranian threat' can provide a huge positive impact on Israeli politics and on the quality of life in the country.
There is only one alternative: continued sanctions, renewed enrichment and in the end military conflict.
When it comes to his 'special means' budget, is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu still faithful to the tradition of restraint of his predecessors?
Asma Aghbarieh-Zahalka is creating a new political discourse in Israel: revolutionary on one hand but non-radical on the other.
Could it be that Netanyahu is the person in charge who has gone crazy and is gambling on a minor apocalypse to prevent a major apocalypse, whereas Barak is the bluffer who will flinch at the moment of truth?
Contrary to previous Israeli leaders, Netanyahu's political use of the Holocaust is a tactic; it is demagoguery and it is a bluff.
The next phase of the assassination war is liable to turn international scientific conferences into arenas of assassination.
Not only is Barak's vision unlikely to be realized, but in fact a military attack is probably what would make nuclear Iran and regional proliferation real. What an irony.
Unlike the past, Israel's public refuses to relay existential keys to 'just two persons,' or even an inner cabinet of eight ministers; this in itself is a positive development.
Although an attack against Iran means a war the likes of which we have never known, the public has entrusted the duo of Netanyahu and Barak with the absolute right to decide.
Long ago, leaders saw ambassadors as personal couriers who brought sensitive political messages in secret and discreetly. Today there is much less of a need for such a function.
In his personality and his actions, Israel Dostrovsky embodied David Ben-Gurion's ideal of the Zionist scientist - a researcher who divided his time between science and security.
Israel's nuclear opacity is perceived by many as a political anachronism that is hard to accept.
It's ironic that an Iran under attack would probably become more determined and purposeful in its nuclear ambitions. After an attack, Iran would abandon the treaty in protest, declare its right to nuclear arms and almost certainly succeed in implementing it.
Israel needs to internalize the insight that all talk about an Iranian bomb is irrational and meaningless.
What was a brilliant and cheap deal back then has become a prolonged and troublesome burden over the years, a Catch-22 from which it is difficult to see how to escape.
Israel's attendance at a nuclear summit will grant recognition and status to its nuclear standing, which it has not had in any international forum.