Investigation Shows in Gaza War, IDF Slacking on Protocols Meant to Protect Civilians

A new report published by the New York Times reveals that military orders issued by Israel Defense Forces leadership in the immediate hours after Hamas launched its October 7 attacks drastically changed previous protocols, allowing for unprecedented levels of risk to civilians in Gaza.

Based on reviews of dozens of military records and interviews with more than 100 IDF soldiers and officials, including 25 directly involved in the process of vetting, approving or striking targets in Gaza, Times investigators found that almost as soon as Israel launched its military campaign in Gaza following the October 7 attacks, IDF leadership relaxed safeguards meant to protect civilians, including risk assessment procedures and target location methods.

When rules were broken or disasters occurred, the investigation found, little effort was made to review what happened or discipline those involved.

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Five senior officers who spoke to the Times used the same expression to describe the prevalent mood inside the Israeli military during the opening days and weeks of its offensive: "harbu darbu." Deriving from an Arabic phrase that translates to "war and blows," it is commonly used in Hebrew to mean attacking an enemy without restraint.

Risk to Civilians

According to the Times report, published on Thursday, orders granted on October 7, which would stay in place moving forward, gave mid-ranking Israeli officers the authority to pursue not only the senior Hamas commanders of past incursions, but the lowest-ranking fighters as well. Even the definition of who was a "military target" was expanded. It included lookouts and money changers suspected of handling Hamas' funds, all of whom were now fair game. In the first seven weeks of the war alone, nearly 30,000 munitions were fired into Gaza.

Officers were also given wider leeway to put civilians at risk – up to 20 civilians per strike, as per the report, compared to previous conflicts where the limit rarely rose higher than 10. The IDF also initially upped its cumulative cap on the number of civilians that could be endangered each day; 500 was the number cited by the Times, before removing it altogether.

On a few occasions, the Times found that senior commanders approved strikes on Hamas leaders, knowing that each one put more than 100 noncombatants in harm's way. Even the method used to calculate how many civilians might be in danger for each strike was overly simplistic and outdated, officers said.

This war has also seen a greater increase in Israel's use of 1,000 and 2,000-pound bombs, many of them American-made. By November, two officers told the Times, Israel's air force had already dropped so many of these, it started running low on the guidance kits that would have transformed them into precision-guided munitions. Instead, they were dropped as dumb-bombs, indiscriminately killing in significantly higher numbers. In some cases, massive bombs were dropped even when a smaller munition could have been used.

At the same time, officers said, there has been a dramatic decrease in so-called roof knocks, warning shots that are typically fired before an attack in order to give civilians time to flee the area. Seven hours after Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel's southern border came a command from Israeli military top brass: roof knocks were now officially optional. In practice, officers told the Times, they are rarely used.

A Depleted Target Bank

The report describes Israel's "target bank," a database of hundreds of Gazan terrorists and locations that the military has researched and vetted before they are attacked. If in earlier wars, the IDF methodically worked their way through the bank, this time around, officers reported to the Times, the air force depleted the list within a matter of days. Intelligence officers were apparently under intense pressure to find new targets, and some were even given quotas to fulfill.

Infinity divisions, in particular, were rushed into building new databases consisting of thousands of low-ranking Hamas operatives. Oftentimes, these databases relied on outdated information, increasing the likelihood that a civilian could be mistaken for a terrorist. To help speed up the process of combing through the sheer volume of data, officers often used artificial intelligence systems.

While the IDF has always claimed that these systems were meant as a jumping off point from which to begin a verification process, officers who spoke to the Times said the actual level of verification varied greatly, depending on the situation. In the most rigorous versions, officers would sometimes hack an intended target's phone in order to gather the necessary proof. As an additional precaution, officers would attempt to trace the phones of the buildings' other known pre-war residents in order to determine if they were operatives as well.

But this was an extremely time-consuming task and was frequently skipped, especially in the case of lower-level targets. The Times also spoke to officers who claimed that, particularly during the chaotic opening weeks of the war, sometimes names found in old databases like the well-known "Lavender" files were not cross-checked at all.

In speaking to officers and reviewing military records, the Times found that after the first two months of the war, the IDF did begin re-tightening its rules of engagement that were loosened on October 7, although they have not gone back to anywhere near their original levels.

Moreover, those who break these rules have done so with almost total impunity. Only two IDF officers are known to have been fired for their role in the initial air campaign, after they oversaw a drone strike that killed several foreign aid workers whom the officers had confused for terrorists.

The IDF has previously said that a panel appointed by Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi was investigating the circumstances of hundreds of strikes. Thus far, no one has been charged in any of the incidents.