Israeli Campaign Against Hamas Is Effort to Impose New Order in West Bank

As the seventh day of Operation Brother’s Keeper dawns, the end is nowhere in sight. The intensive search for the three teenagers and their Hamas captors has yielded no reported breakthrough.

We know that terrorists from the Hebron region were arrested – some of whom are being toughly interrogated for quick information about the abduction.

A vital piece of information at the right moment could lead the security forces to the cell, enabling them to find the abducted youths.

The security forces’ efforts are justified. The government’s duty is to protect its people. When three innocent youths are abducted on their way home, using any proportional military means is legitimate. But it seems the time has come to say a few things about a central aspect of the operation, which is going way beyond its initial goal – the campaign against Hamas in the West Bank.

So far the IDF has detained some 280 Palestinians, mostly Hamas people, raided the movement’s offices, closed a radio station, confiscated computers and seized documents. The complete absence of armed resistance in the West Bank so far makes Israelis believe this is a low-cost operation.

Expanding the strike on Hamas has a clear strategic rationale – Israel wants to separate the Palestinian Authority and Hamas again, after their reconciliation agreement. The Israeli measures even coincide, to a certain extent, with the PA’s interest, since the latter is furious with Hamas for the damage it believes the abduction has caused the Palestinian efforts in the international arena. This was reflected in Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ harsh criticism Wednesday of the abduction.

But the campaign against Hamas also has a political context. The Shalit deal is seen by Israel’s right wing as the Netanyahu’s government’s great disgrace, due to the release of 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the abducted soldier. The deal still hangs heavy over Netanyahu. Earlier this week he was challenged by far right minister Naftali Bennett, who pushed forward the bill restricting the release of terrorists. At the same time there are increasing indications that many of the terrorists released in the Shalit deal returned to terrorist activity.

So the abduction poses a great political risk for Netanyahu. In addition to the sympathy for the youths’ families, the right wing and settlers feel great rage. The prime minister must ride this tiger if he doesn’t want to be caught in its fangs. Punishing Hamas enables the Israeli public, most of which is in favor of a military strike on Hamas, to release steam. In days like these, even usually restrained politicians tend to rant and rave.

Even MK Shaul Mofaz, of the opposition, called for the mobilization of reserve troops to smash Hamas in the West Bank, as though he were still chief of staff. But the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield was a perfectly justified operation, which came in response to the terrible terror wave and reduced the threat on Israel’s civilians. Brother’s Keeper may turn out to be a little different.

Meanwhile, enthusiasm is running high. The operation provides lots of photo ops for the prime minister and the ministers. It has also completely turned around the political agenda, in which Netanyahu had been on the defensive in the midst of a crisis in Likud, along with his failed attempts to influence the election of the new president.

From the IDF’s point of view, the situation even offered a few advantages. The units, which had been busy with policing duties and almost didn’t train due to the budget controversy, returned to operational activity.

But as time goes by and the abducted youths are not found, the frustration rises. The IDF is powerful and has unusual capabilities. When the result is not achieved, however, armies tend to look for other ways to express their ability.

The hundreds of Hamas people detained this week were mostly the usual suspects. If the Shin Bet had substantial information about their involvement in terrorist activity, they would probably have been arrested earlier. Most of them are members of the organization’s political wing and are indirectly associated with terror. The emphasis on striking the “civilian infrastructure” looks like an exhibition.

In the army too there must be officers who are beginning to question the benefit of such acts. In the security cabinet discussions, the attorney general is taking a moderate, skeptical approach in a bid to restrict reckless moves.

Israel had better remember that when an operation continues, things tend to get complicated and could lead to trouble — the loss of soldiers, or the killing of Palestinian civilians. Israel is trying to impose a new order in the West Bank, which is not directly associated with the abduction.