The northern bother

1. Syria

The main reason why the Israel Defense Forces is currently not recommending a large-scale ground operation in the Gaza Strip is not talked about much publicly: It is the apprehension that this summer Israel is liable to be engaged in a different war - against Syria. In light of this more threatening scenario, and knowing that it will be difficult to achieve concrete results in Gaza without a large and lengthy concentration of forces and resources, the IDF is currently inclined to go with a policy of "more of the same" in the Strip. Despite the ongoing rocket fire directed at Sderot, the General Staff continues to object to an extensive operation at this time.

The intelligence assessments in the northern sector don't appear to have changed radically. As far as is known, the Israeli intelligence community does not have information pointing to clear intentions on the part of Syrian President Bashar Assad to launch a war. However, there are intelligence reports about the preparations Syria is making for such a possibility: training, exercises, major arms deals. Intelligence personnel are finding it difficult to formulate a bottom line: whether Assad truly intends to go to war or whether he is merely taking measures to be on the safe side, while seeking to exert pressure on Israel to renew peace negotiations.

For the IDF, the question of intentions is secondary. The army has to be ready for a Syrian attack, and a preoccupation with the southern sector will detract from the operational tension in the North. On the other hand, the General Staff remembers the affair of Yehuda Gil, the Mossad espionage agency man who inflated the warnings about Syria's intentions in the summer of 1996 and almost precipitated a war. Mistaken interpretation of the adversary's intentions is liable to spark a flare-up. This is known as the "miscalculation" scenario - an English word that is used in General Staff discussions. A variation on this scenario was tested last month, in the major exercise code-named "Avnei Esh 10."

Even though the scenario tested also deals with escalation on other fronts, including the Palestinian, it was evident to the participating officers that the territories, including Gaza, are currently a secondary front. Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi is bothered mainly by the northern sector. The GOC Central Command, Yair Naveh (who will be succeeded next week by Major General Gadi Shamni), has been telling his staff the same thing for some time. Central Command is at present a secondary sector, and its main task is not to interfere with entanglements that are liable to develop in other sectors.

2. Second level

In the "stages plan" the chief of staff presented to the security cabinet concerning the possibilities for action in Gaza, the IDF is still stuck on the second stage, on a scale of one to five. Ground activity is confined to the open areas close to the fence, although the forces have now advanced slightly further. This week a special unit operated east of Khan Yunis, two kilometers west of the security fence. The level of authorization required for some of the actions has been lowered from the General Staff to Southern Command and the Gaza Division.

Southern Command is increasingly convinced that sending a large ground force into the built-up areas of Gaza will be far more complicated this time round than in similar IDF operations in the past, such as the one that followed the abduction of Gilad Shalit last June. The defensive infrastructure Hamas has built is based on the lessons drawn by Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War. This week senior officers likened the breaching of the first line of buildings in Gaza to that of breaking through the "shredder" - the strip Hezbollah created on the northern border, which is but a few kilometers wide. It took the IDF nearly two weeks to breach it, at the price of no few casualties.

With the war in Gaza being conducted on a low level of intensity, the IDF is meanwhile satisfactorily noting an improvement of performance in other spheres. The Home Front Command is evincing great energy in Sderot. Its commander, Yitzhak Gershon, who was badly burned in the state comptroller's report, is determined to show that the lesson of Lebanon has been learned. To no small degree, the IDF this week captured a town - except that it was Sderot, not Beit Hanun.

At the same time, Southern Command is receiving various executive powers from the General Staff. During the Second Lebanon War, Major General Udi Adam, then the GOC Northern Command, could only dream of the independence the GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, now enjoys. Most activity in the Gaza Strip is now being coordinated by Southern Command, as Galant had urged for more than a year. This framework includes the increased use of special forces, while the ground activity remains largely defensive. The forces are engaged in averting threats, above all another abduction via a tunnel. The presence of Givati Brigade infantry forces and armored units in the Gaza Strip, close to the fence, is intended to hamper the launching of Qassam rockets. In particular these troops are there to prevent Hamas from establishing a firing range drawing closer to Ashkelon.

Another lesson learned from earlier rounds of fighting is that even though the number of Qassams fired this week declined by about two-thirds (from a peak of more than 30 a day to an average of 10), the army is not attributing this to its activity, most certainly not in public. It's possible that the decrease can be explained in part by Hamas' desire to retain ammunition for the future.

The brunt of the offensive effort is being borne by the air force. Within two weeks about 50 permanent targets were attacked (including headquarters, training camps and storage depots) as well as some 20 squads that operated launchers and rockets. About 60 terrorists were killed, most of them affiliated with Hamas and the others loyal to Islamic Jihad. During this period approximately 300 Qassams were fired, 50 of which fell inside the Gaza Strip.

What is now going on in Gaza cannot really be called an "operation." It is ongoing activity against terrorism, which can produce only limited results. If Hamas were to cease firing rockets completely, the army might show restraint in air attacks, but would not halt the pressure on Hamas entirely. Even if there is an escalation, the IDF will object to a limited move, which it views as the worst of all possible worlds, for example sending a brigade or two into the Strip for two or three weeks, having it do a lot of killing but achieve almost no results. Israeli deterrence will only suffer from that.

The army maintains that a large-scale, prolonged operation will be needed in the future, even though it is clear that this will entail a steep price. In the Gaza Strip, in contrast to southern Lebanon, the civilian population has nowhere to flee to. Every ground battle will take place in a densely populated civilian setting and will bring the army up against a huge number of armed individuals - more than 50,000.

These, then, are the current rules of the game in Gaza. Israel is not trying to create a system for a complete end to the confrontation. So far Hamas, some of whose senior members have gone into hiding, does not have a good enough reason to stop the shelling. The balance is not tilted because Israel is not registering a genuine military achievement. And in the meantime, Israel is losing a city: Sderot is not returning to normal routine, not even in the minimal sense, to calmer periods of grace it has enjoyed over the past six years.

3. Come down from the roofs

On Monday of this week, Gaza was prepared for another round of fighting between Fatah and Hamas. A seemingly negligible incident was about to put an end to the imaginary quiet that had prevailed between the sides since Israel started to bomb Hamas targets. A checkpoint manned by members of Force 17 (the Presidential Guard, identified with Fatah) was checking cars on a street in Gaza City. Passengers in one of the cars, Hamas activists, declined to be checked and opened fire. The incident was the signal for dozens of militants from both organizations to launch the local "real estate competition": which side would seize control of more roofs on Gaza high-rises. The higher the building, the better it is for observation, control and sniping. That evening, activists of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades moved quickly to take positions atop the buildings close to the Saraya, the main headquarters of the security forces of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

Fatah believed Hamas would try to gain control of the Saraya, or at least over the structures surrounding it, as soon as the fighting began, and therefore preempted its adversaries. Hamas men positioned themselves on the roofs of the high-rise buildings surrounding the tall buildings nearby the headquarters. In the meantime, dozens of armed men set up roadblocks in the streets.

However, this time the Egyptian security delegation, along with senior Hamas and Fatah figures, was able to calm things down. A special team, which had been set up in advance and includes leading activists from both camps, went into the streets. The mediators all but implored the gunmen on the buildings, "Please, come down from the roofs."

Although the incident did not deteriorate into a lengthy shootout, everyone in Gaza knows that if a cease-fire with Israel is secured, it will take only hours, days at most, before the fighting between Fatah and Hamas resumes. "This time it will be a more violent and longer round," one Gaza commentator says. "None of the problematic issues between the organizations have been resolved. Most of the armed men who belong to the organizations' military branches are youngsters aged 18 to 25. They have no hope for a better future. All they have learned and seen in recent years has to do with firearms, violence and shaheeds [martyrs]. It's unbelievable how quick their fingers are on the trigger. Majanin [crazies].

"They will not hesitate to shoot one another again," the commentator continues. "Fatah loyalists refer to Hamas as the 'blood people,' and Hamas calls the Fatah people 'heretics.' It's far from over. In the meantime, what is helping us avoid internecine fighting is Israel, which is forcing both organizations to back away from mutual attacks, which would be construed as aid to the enemy. Your army has become a more effective mediator than the Egyptians," the commentator says mockingly.

The dilemma Fatah is having difficulty solving concerns Israel's intensified activity against the members of the organization's military wing in the West Bank. This week two of the founders of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the West Bank, Khaled Shwish and Jamal Tirawi, were arrested. The IDF also killed two key activists of the organization, who, like the others, were part of the "center stream" identified with Abbas. Tirawi, who is a Palestinian parliament member, is also considered to be a confidant of the Palestinian Authority's national security adviser, Mohammed Dahlan. These are activists who receive a budget from the PA and assist Fatah and Dahlan in consolidating their hold in the West Bank. In recent years it seemed as though Israel preferred to ignore their past activity (the detainees were involved in serious terrorist attacks in the first three years of the present intifada), in order to aid Abbas and Dahlan. This week the Israeli policy appeared to have changed.

4. Summer camp at home

Fear continues to dominate the lives of the Gaza Strip's residents: fear of being hurt in an Israeli bombing raid or by internecine exchanges of fire. Despite the fighting against Israel, the violent incidents between the clans, as well as criminal clashes, are continuing. Just this week the director general of the Finance Ministry in Gaza was abducted, even though he was being escorted by bodyguards, and the director general of the courts was shot and wounded by unknown assailants.

The school year ended this week, and many parents are wondering anxiously what to do with the children during the summer vacation. "I will not send the children to summer camps, even though they are free, because I am concerned for their lives," says F., a Gaza taxi driver. "Anything is liable to happen to them on the way to or at the camp. It's better for them to stay home." The economic situation continues to worsen: More and more residents are dependent on support from international or Islamic aid groups.

One person who has recently begun to benefit from the increased inflax of money from abroad, and who has used it to recruit more supporters and buy more arms, is Mumtaz Durmush, the leader of his rogue clan. Durmush appears to be receiving economic aid from elements identified with the ideals of Al-Qaida, and he has therefore recently begun "to speak Al-Qaidish." He constantly spouts extreme slogans, which recall those of the fundamentalists in Iraq. "You have cause for concern," the Gaza commentator says. "The Durmush family always allied with the rising power in Gaza. First they collaborated with Israel, then with Fatah. At the start of the present intifada they crossed the lines to Hamas. Now they are operating independently, but with the aid of radical Islamic groups from abroad, which only Allah knows how to deal with."