Without personal conclusions

The deep mourning that befell the country in the wake of the 2006 Lebanon war was quickly replaced by a tremendous lust, as is written in the verse in Numbers 11, 4: "And the mixed multitude that was among them were seized by lust and the children of Israel also wept again." But the lust of the generation leaving Egypt was: "And they said: Who will give us meat to eat?" whereas the lust of the generation leaving Lebanon, not necessarily the mixed multitude, is somewhat different. The children of Israel of our generation are weeping and saying: "Who will appoint an investigative committee for us?"

The State of Israel is currently in the grip of a real frenzy. Everyone is awaiting the decision of the Winograd Committee. Some say it is likely to determine the political fate of the prime minister. The entire history of the State of Israel, and even prior to it, is full of committees, from the Peel Commission sent by His Majesty's Government, up to today's Shohat Committee, and including the Agranat Commission, the Kahan Commission, the Zorea Commission, the Shamgar Commission, the Beisky Commission, the Etzioni Commission, the Shenhar Commission, the Or Commission, the Dovrat Commission, the Zeiler Commission and all kinds of other commissions, headed by various and sundry princes and leaders of the land.

After 60 years of intensive activity on the part of investigative committees and commissions of inquiry, we should ask what the point of all this is. Did any commission of inquiry ever have any real impact on the state's conduct? And if it did exert influence, was that a blessing for Israeli society, or is the longing for committees nothing but a kind of addiction to drugs, which, in the best case scenario, causes little damage to those who use them?

It is true that for someone who considers an investigative committee a tribunal for removing people from their jobs, some of the committees did in fact do just that. Apparently, that was also how the members of those committees perceived their roles, and they included the juicy sections in their reports. These sections determined who would rest and who would wander, who would die at his predestined time and who before his time. These sections are usually the only parts of the thick report that are read.

However, as interesting and exciting and highly rated as the personal fates of people such as a prime minister, chief of staff or director general of a government ministry are, this issue is not really of any public import. The question that should be preoccupying the public is not whether Ehud Olmert will continue to swivel on the prime minister's chair or will be forced to let go of it, but whether the next prime minister of the State of Israel will be Olmert or a person who is better, or worse, than he.

A public commission of inquiry is not a theater critic. A statement by a theater critic to the effect that a certain actor in a play has failed and was not at all suited to his role is legitimate, and when the critic makes such a comment, he has done his job. The question as to whether there is anyone in the world who knows how to fill the role better than the unsuccessful actor need not interest the critic. For his part, if the theater is incapable of finding a suitable actor for the role, it must shut down the play. But political life is not theater. It is impossible to close the play called the State of Israel. All the roles in this play must be filled at all times.

If a commission of inquiry presumes to determine that someone in a central public position is not worthy of his role, it must name at least one person who can do the job better. Otherwise, the rejection of a person who bears great national responsibility in itself borders on irresponsibility.

Even if it is headed by a judge, a public committee that is supposed to investigate an affair from the past can have only one worthwhile role: determining the historical facts as credibly as humanly possible. Therefore, even the practice of sending cautionary letters to people whose behavior is being investigated by the committee is an invalid and misleading one, which stems from a basic misunderstanding of the essential limitations of any commission of inquiry that is not a courtroom.

The Winograd Committee, for example, may be able to decide that the call-up of reservists during the war was done too early, too late or just in time, according to the judgment of its members. It can also decide that the army's emergency warehouses suffered from a lack of preparedness when the war broke out, or that the complaints of the reservists who were present were fictitious. And it can perhaps express the opinion that the decision to go to war was made by the prime minister in an irresponsible manner, or after long and profound consideration. On the other hand, the committee cannot do what many people expect of it - "to come to personal conclusions."

The committee is not fit to decide whether Ehud Olmert is worthy of heading the Israeli government. The only question of public significance is whether it is a good idea for Ehud Olmert to continue to be prime minister. The committee cannot offer any reply to that, since none of its members knows any better than other citizens if the next prime minister will be better than Olmert.

The writer is a professor of astronomy at Tel Aviv University.