Who's afraid of fingerprints?

The Interior Ministry wants identity cards to contain fingerprints and a biometric photograph, in order to prevent forgeries and impersonation. The cabinet approved the proposal unanimously at its weekly Sunday meeting. The initiative has not yet reached the legislative stage, but there already has been a public outcry against the excessive injury to privacy.

It is hard to understand why a fingerprint, though unique and thus enabling absolute identification, is arousing opposition in a society where most personal information is available via court order or illegally. The health maintenance organizations store the public's health secrets in their computer systems; the tax authorities and the banks hold financial information; the mobile phone companies know who we have called, when and where; and the credit card companies know consumers' consumption, travel and recreation habits at home and abroad.

It is impossible to prevent the existence of databases that are potentially injurious to privacy, but technical and legal means must be created to keep information from passing between bodies. The commercial use of personal data to make phone and e-mail solicitations is more invasive and harassing than any use the state will make of fingerprints.

In fact, a databases of encoded fingerprints and photographs, as opposed to other databases, can benefit the citizen more than it can harm him. Having an absolute means of identification can help find suspects quickly, even though one fingerprint is not enough for this. Biometric identity cards will help not only to solve crimes but also to prevent them, as forged documents help enable all kinds of violations of the law.

The main objection is to the database, and not to the biometric ID cards. The fear of the data being misused is justified, and stiff punishments must be legislated for misusing the information. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand why specifically fingerprints, which reveal very little personal information, are considered an unacceptable violation of privacy. Medical and financial information, and records of private conversations, are far more problematic in this respect.

The argument that only totalitarian states fingerprint their citizens is wrong, although no country has a complete national database yet. England is gradually shifting to biometric identity cards; France has biometric passports; and the United States fingerprints every government employee. Israel already has a fingerprint database of all Israel Defense Forces conscripts since 1973. Court permission is necessary to access it, and permission is granted in only a few cases. The new database will be accessible only by judicial order.

As with any legislation that infringes on a basic right to some extent, the potential damage must be weighed against the benefits. The certain prevention of forged identity cards and passports is enough of a reason to welcome the innovation. If there is a simple, available technical means that can prevent hostile elements from entering Israel and moving around the country freely, and can also replace worse, more invasive means like wiretapping, interrogation under torture, arrest and surveillance, then it should be welcomed, and should be put to use sensibly and soon.