The next great confrontation

Historian Tony Judt writes in his book "Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945" that in the 1970s the Italian far right could rely on political and police networks that cooperated with them and offered protection. One such network had 962 members, including 30 generals, eight admirals, 43 members of parliament, three cabinet ministers and top level representatives of the church, industry and private banking. The neo-fascist right could also depend to a certain degree on the collaboration of the state machinery whose functioning it wanted to disrupt.

Italy wasn't the only place in Europe where the right operated in concert with the state apparatus in order to disrupt or sabotage government activities. In the 1960s, military officers and settlers in Algeria rebelled against president Charles de Gaulle's decision to offer the territory self-determination. The secret military organization that declared the rebellion was an extension of the Committee for the Protection of French Algeria that was set up during the second half of the 1950s as a lobby opposing any concessions by Paris to the Algerian national movement. In both Italy and France, the moment of truth came when the governments had to confront themselves.

The French case was graver, because the internal confrontation with the establishment rebels took place at the same time as the external battle against the Algerian national movement. It was sometimes a violent struggle and sometimes political, carried out under the framework of negotiations. In Italy, the struggle was only an internal one, although here too, it was not the only struggle. Along with the far right, the state had to contend with extremist left-wing organizations and the mafia, both of which were operating against it.

Both of these cases are relevant to Israel. The right-wing government here enjoys the legitimate and democratic support of most of the electorate. Even if all of its representatives do not roundly condemn the actions of the extreme right, such as the "price tag" campaign, they do not all express support for them. But it is nevertheless impossible to avoid the question of whether, just around the corner, the great national confrontation is not waiting - the one that will follow the minor confrontation with the rabbi of the Har Bracha hesder yeshiva, Eliezer Melamed. The signs that this could happen include the dispute over the withdrawal from Gaza, the clashes during the evacuation of outposts, the enforcement of the temporary building freeze in the settlements, and the dispute over evacuating Beit Yonatan in Silwan.

State apparatuses, including security forces and civil institutions, have collaborated with settler organizations, as documented in books, various reports and journalistic accounts. What will happen if the state decides, with the support of the majority of Israelis, to withdraw from the West Bank and East Jerusalem?

The question is not whether the settlements can be dismantled in the first place, but whether the state institutions can be disbanded and re-established. It is easy to argue that it won't happen, precisely because of the symbiosis between those state institutions and the settlers, and their overlapping interests. But the above examples show that one day Israeli society may have to face up to the problem in all of its severity.

It is also impossible not to wonder if decision makers are making the threat from Iran, Syria and Hezbollah seem greater than it really is in order to postpone or prevent the great internal confrontation.

The writer is a political science lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and a research fellow at the European University Institute in Florence.