Terror has a bank account

In a wide-scale operation launched Wednesday by security forces in Ramallah, police and Shin Bet officers raided three banks and confiscated some NIS 37 million on the suspicion that they were "terror funds." Based on lists prepared in advance, they examined more than 400 accounts held by private individuals and various charities. The operation encountered resistance from local residents, and 17 Palestinians who clashed with the forces were wounded by rubber-coated steel bullets. Three are in serious condition.

Although Israel has raided Palestinian banks in the past, this operation was of a wholly different order. It is an expression of an understanding that has emerged quite belatedly in the political and security echelons, that the economic front is one of the main battlefields in the war against terrorism. The chain of terror that ends with the suicide bomber in a city bus does not begin with those who send the bomber or with the bomber's spiritual mentors. The first link in the chain is the fund raiser. To produce the explosives, to purchase weapons and most of all, to pay the families of the suicide bombers and their commanders - all this costs a lot of money.

Most of the money for financing terror comes from the Arab states, Iran and Islamic charities around the world. The money trail is complicated and difficult to track down and prove. That is apparently why implementing a systematic approach to dealing with the problem has taken so long. Only lately have the security agencies begun devoting the necessary resources to combating it.

Raids on bank branches and computer centers are a legitimate means to use in the war on terror. In the wake of 9/11, the United States preceded Israel in taking tough steps, including shutting down "charity funds" and outlawing Islamic organizations that are tied to terror. But confiscating money from a bank does not necessarily harm the financial capabilities of terror groups, and there is concern that more such actions will harm innocent account holders, or even bring down the banks.

In such a complex operation it is very important to avoid causing collateral damage and making poor use of confiscated funds. According to Israel Defense Forces officers, the orders for the operation indeed specified such care. As opposed to the wide-scale destruction and damage caused by soldiers to civil Palestinian infrastructure in West Bank towns during Operation Defensive Shield, soldiers were not allowed this time into the banks, and all the activity inside the branches was conducted by officers from the Shin Bet and police.

The operation will now be considered successful if in addition to the confiscation of the funds, Israel is able to present proof that indeed they were used for terror, and at the same time it institutes a proper procedure for account holders to appeal the confiscation of their money.

In the wake of the operation, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said the confiscated money would be used for "the welfare of the Palestinians." Such a step, even if well-intentioned, could be considered paternalistic, especially if some of the money is spent on "improving the infrastructure" at checkpoints in the territories.

The campaign against terror is still in its early stages and legal loopholes still enable the continued flow of money. There is a bill prohibiting financing terror, which is being held up in the Knesset, and so far the requirement of reporting the transfer of cash from Israel into the territories has yet to be fully enforced.