Simulated quiet

The quiet that has reigned for the past two weeks is simulated. Two weeks ago, the two severe terrorist attacks took place in Tzrifin and at Cafe Hillel in Jerusalem, claiming the lives of 15 people. As usual, after severe acts of terrorism, Yasser Arafat is offering Israel a hudna. He made the same type of offer after the bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya on Passover Eve 2002 and after the brutal terrorist attack at the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv on June 1, 2001.

On every such occasion, there are those in Israel who ask: How we could possibly turn down a proposal for a cease-fire? Outwardly, Hamas and Islamic Jihad seem to be curbing themselves; for the time being, Israel is also exercising restraint, and has not struck at the political leadership of the two organizations. So why not keep the ball rolling and extend the period of quiet, many are asking.

One big problem is that to Hamas, it is still permissible - hudna or not - to blow up buses and passengers, for example, last month's bombing of the No. 2 bus in Jerusalem. Even if the Hamas leadership in Gaza agrees to a hudna that would rule out bombings, the organization's members in Hebron interpret the hudna to mean something else.

Another problem is that we forget. Two quiet weeks are an awful lot of time. The images of the victims of the latest terrorist attack are jumbled up with the faces of victims of previous attacks. Our tragedy-saturated memory is a blur, and we grow increasingly stultified to the suffering on the Palestinian side.

Similarly, the quiet can be deceptive if it serves as a cover, an interlude used by murderers to amass power and shore up their new hiding places. Indeed, bad things are going on behind the curtains. The number of warnings issued about possible terrorist attacks, including suicide bombers, has even gone up. It currently stands at 49. About 40 percent of these warnings relate to Hamas, and another 40 percent to Tanzim. Military Intelligence says the problem is the Tanzim gangs that received money from Hezbollah and Iran. In proposing the new hudna, Arafat knows this, but - as usual - is doing nothing to prevent preparations for terror attacks. It's the well-known game: "He doesn't initiate terror but neither does he prevent it." In any event, as the leader, the entire responsibility remains his.

The lull in terrorist attacks can be effective if exploited for realization of the conditions presented by the Americans to Ahmed Qureia (and to his predecessor, Mahmoud Abbas). But those conditions were not realized. Arafat's current hudna proposal bis no different from previous offers. At best, it is a general declaration of intentions, which in the past were crudely violated. Such a declaration can no longer be a basis for agreement, certainly not with Arafat.

Nevertheless, there are two things that Israel has to do. One is a "Thou shalt not." So long as the quiet persists, in spite of the numerous warnings of planned terror attacks, Israel must not initiate targeted assassination raids against the Hamas and Jihad leadership. Although the targets are identified, even in their new hiding places, it would be best to avoid action during a period of quiet, and especially while Qureia is trying to set up a government. Targeted assassinations should only be employed only in the event of an obvious "ticking bomb."

The other thing that Israel must do is draw up an itemized list of Palestinian actions to be taken before a cease-fire agreement can be reached. After Israel's bad experience with the first hudna, the Palestinian government must start taking action. Pronouncement can come at the end. The Americans presented this itemized list better than Israel (which remained silent) when Qureia was asked to replace Abbas as prime minister. First, they said, he has to unite the various security agencies under one commander (and not Arafat). This did not happen. Second, to start disarming the terror groups and collecting their weapons. This, too, did not happen. Third, to stop the weapons smuggling - and that didn't happen, either. Fourth, to implement the reforms in the Palestinian Authority.

To date, little has been done. More or less, this has to be the checklist, for Israel, too. As the items are checked off the list, the cease-fire will expand and develop into an overall understanding. This expansion would ensure that the U.S. would not suffice with Israeli declarations on the illegal settlement outposts, and lead to a resumption of talks on the road map.