Reconsidering Israel's nuclear ambiguity

Benjamin Netanyahu has already indicated that Iranian nuclearization is issue number one. Mr. Netanyahu also must understand that Israel's own nuclear doctrine will have to adapt. A core element of this adaptation should concern Israel's nuclear ambiguity. Jerusalem's nuclear policy has always been to keep Israel's presumed nuclear capabilities quietly in the "basement." Now, the new prime minister will have to decide if it may soon be time for some sort of disclosure. This is because an ambiguous nuclear deterrent may not work indefinitely.

Israel's nuclear ambiguity has done little to deter "ordinary" conventional enemy aggressions or acts of terror. It has succeeded in keeping the country's enemies from mounting existential attacks. But certain changes in strategic doctrine could be necessary.

Oblivious to the call for meaningful sanctions by a plainly impotent "international community," Tehran continues to "go nuclear." Unless there is a prompt, comprehensive and sustained preemptive strike against Iran's developing nuclear assets and infrastructures, an act of "anticipatory self-defense" under international law, Israel will face an openly genocidal nuclear Iran. Still, the prospect of such legally permissible defensive strikes is now very low, and Israel will likely have to prepare to secure itself against a nuclear Iran with both ballistic missile defense (Arrow/Hetz) and improved nuclear deterrence.

Prime Minister-designate Netanyahu will understand that adequate deterrence of Iran could soon require some release of pertinent Israeli nuclear details. Concerning these details, less rather than more Israeli nuclear secrecy could be required. What will now need to be determined is the precise extent and subtlety with which Israel should communicate its nuclear positions, intentions and capabilities to Iran, and certain others.

The rationale for any nuclear disclosure would not lie in expressing the obvious. Instead, it would rest on the presumption that nuclear weapons attributed to Israel can serve Israel's security by communicating certain military capabilities and intentions. The form and extent of any strategic disclosure could be more critical than before because the new president of the United States seems determined to proceed with a one-sided "peace process."

Israel's state enemies - especially Iran, Egypt and Syria - will likely continue to enlarge and refine both their conventional and unconventional military capabilities. In one case, Mr. Ahmadinejad could conceivably cast aside all of the usual considerations of rational behavior. Were this to happen, the Islamic Republic of Iran could effectively become a nuclear suicide-bomber in macrocosm.

To protect against enemy strikes, particularly those attacks that could carry intolerable costs, Mr. Netanyahu should exploit every relevant aspect and function of Israel's own presumed nuclear arsenal, if indeed it does have these weapons, and doctrine. The success of his efforts will depend not only on its particular choice of targeting doctrine ("counterforce" or "counter city"), but also upon the extent to which this key choice is made known in advance. Before enemies can be deterred from launching first strikes against Israel, and before they can be deterred from launching retaliatory attacks following any Israeli preemption, it may not be enough to assume only that Israel has the Bomb. These enemies may also need to recognize that nuclear weapons attributed to Israel are sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks, and that they are pointed directly at high-value population targets.

Removing the presumed bomb from Israel's basement could enhance Israel's nuclear deterrence to the extent that it would heighten enemy perceptions of secure and capable Israeli nuclear forces. Such a calculated end to deliberate ambiguity could also underscore Israel's willingness to use these nuclear forces in reprisal for certain enemy first-strike and retaliatory attacks.

For now, as Mr. Netanyahu surely knows, Israel's nuclear capabilities should remain ambiguous. But soon - at the very moment that Iran is discovered to be close to completing its own nuclear weapons capability - the Jewish State should put a prompt end to deliberate nuclear ambiguity.

Prime Minister-designate Netanyahu already understands that there could never be any reliable peace with a nuclear Iran. But if neither Israel nor the United States will undertake preemptive destruction of Iran's nearlycompleted nuclear program, Israel will have to take its own bomb out of the "basement." Such an essential end to deliberate nuclear ambiguity may still not be sufficient to save Israel from an eventual nuclear war with Iran, but it would surely be better than continuing with a no longer viable policy of protracted uncertainty.

The author was chair of Project Daniel. He is Professor of International Law at Purdue University and the author of many major books and articles on nuclear strategy and nuclear war.