Outdated concept of ground forces

In his poem "The Charge of the Light Brigade," Alfred, Lord Tennyson, laments the bloody battlefield left after the English cavalry charged the Russian guns in the Crimean War in 1854. The cavalry was almost annihilated.

Indeed, the military practices until World War I could only amaze us today. Soldiers went to battle dressed in their finest clothes, red trousers and blue military coats with gold-embroidered seams, or white trousers and red coats with silver buttons, polished boots and swords hanging from their waists. The regiments were a beautiful sight as they rode their horses or marched to the beat of drums into enemy lines.

Only at the beginning of the 20th century did the military concept change. Leaders realized that the gorgeous peacock uniform and proud march straight into enemy guns proved fatal to the soldiers, and that it was preferable to enhance their chances of survival with camouflage. This may not be especially attractive, but it is much more effective in protecting the soldiers. Soldiers were supplied with steel helmets for the first time.

This lesson and others should be noted now that it is clear Israel will not be able to stay in Lebanon, and Hezbollah will not be dealt with without a political solution.

Hence the question of putting ground forces in South Lebanon is not just one of military tactics. It is a question of politics and principle.

What is the point of endangering soldiers' lives, when it is clear in advance that Israel will not be able to preserve the battles' military achievements?

In addition, if Israel's goal is to put a complete end to hostile activity, and not only to destroy temporarily a small part of the enemy's infrastructures, what is the point of a local incursion if it's certain to cost many soldiers' lives?

There is no escape from feeling that involving the ground forces in the fighting derives, above all, from the fixation of military thinking, which is activating the wrong battle methods simply because it is used to doing so, and not because they are really effective in achieving the ends.

The key question concerns the role of ground troops, given how local and geopolitical concepts have changed since World War II. Conquering foreign territories and occupying them for prolonged periods is unacceptable to the Western community today.

The ground troops' job had always been to advance or prevent conquests deriving from one state's military capability of physically occupying another's territory. But since the end of the "occupation era" and since ongoing occupation of foreign territory is becoming an untenable policy, there is no escape but to acknowledge that ground forces have lost their historic significance.

The emphasis has shifted to a deterrent air force, whose duty is no longer to ensure ongoing physical control of the ground, but only to activate prevention and punishment, which in turn are also problematic.

The old concept was that aerial bombing was to prepare the ground for troops. Abandoning the option of occupation shifts the preference to forces that can create area dominance and political leverage from afar, without all the messy consequences of holding territory.

But pushing the ground troops to the sidelines is not simple, in view of their traditional place and role as the heart of the Israeli defense establishment. Such an army is necessary mainly for situations of a large territorial incursion. However, such invasions usually bring strong pressures to end the occupation and entangle their perpetrators in brutal, futile guerrilla war.

Thus, beyond the operation of small, effective commando forces that can carry out immediate missions and return quickly to their base, there is hardly any real use for this large army, and it is doomed to be excluded from the post-occupation military battle.

Therefore, there is a danger that the army's commanders, who have not adjusted yet to the conceptual upheaval, will embroil the war with futile ground battles - resulting in fatalities - and will not be able to justify their efforts. Their hold on the territory will have to end sooner or later, and their ability to continue preventing hostile activity will return to the frustrating starting point.

The existence of a large, pointless ground force strengthens the recognition that only a political agreement between the sides could ensure enduring mutual quiet.