Opportunism at a critical moment

If Yosef Lapid had been asked to agree to the transfer of NIS 300 million to a Gush Katif arts yeshiva, and not an ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) yeshiva, as part of the compensation for the disengagement, he certainly would have agreed without hesitation. But Shinui knows what its voters like, so it chose the moment of truth, when the historic disengagement from Gaza is on the scales, to prevent the entire move from happening just so it would not be suspected of surrendering to the Haredim. Shinui makes sure to use the term "extortion" only toward one sector of the population, the Haredim, and everything is kosher in its war against them, and every refusal of their demands is considered an achievement.

Shinui's refusal to transfer money to the Haredim is not ideological. The Haredim are not demanding religious legislation to support the Sharon government, they are not demanding any change that contravenes the principles of Shinui, and the transfer of money to the yeshivot will not increase the state budget. But Shinui has not had a single impressive secular achievement to which it can point in the Haredi-less government in which it has served in the last two years, and it fears that it will be exposed as such in the coming elections if it cannot point to an achievement, not matter how marginal and unimpressive it is.

That is the only way to understand its vehement opposition to transferring the money to the Haredim. The irony of fate is that by leaving the government, Shinui is paving the way to a government with Haredim, which will strengthen their political position and that of the National Religious Party. It is possible that with its own hands, Shinui will force early elections that could be followed by the establishment of an even more rightist, religious government.

Shinui is not leaving the government because of harm done to its principles in the areas of religious coercion or religious legislation, or because Sharon announced a policy that contradicts fundamental policies of the party. It is leaving because an opportunity was created for it to fan the flames of secular-Haredi hatred, which greases the wheels of the party, and thus perhaps it may gain a Knesset seat or two in the coming elections. But the price the state will pay if the disengagement plan goes down the drain is far greater than the NIS 300 million that Sharon wants to transfer to the Haredim so that he can go ahead with the disengagement.

If Sharon is forced to go to elections, the settlers and the entire right will benefit from the postponement of the disengagement timetable and perhaps the cancellation of the entire plan. The price will be paid in blood, in a missed historic opportunity, and a dangerous gamble that Sharon, in his moderate, conciliatory guise toward the Palestinians, won't return to serve as prime minister. Who knows if another leader will be able to stand up to the settlers and evacuate even a single one of the settlements.

Shinui's stubborn insistence on conducting a virtual and demagogic campaign at such a critical moment over such a marginal matter is nothing more than a pitiable exercise in public relations. There is no issue on the agenda that makes it worthwhile to break up a government on the verge of a revolutionary change. Shinui is being revealed at this moment of truth as a gaggle of politicians who are best at talk, unable to discern the chaff from the wheat, and ready to sacrifice the main achievement of their government in exchange for a few Knesset seats that may or may not fall into their laps in elections that nobody other than them want. The only explanation for it is ephemeral political opportunism, instead of the long-term political vision required by the importance of this moment.