Not Israel's policemen

All the signs indicate that Hamas in the Gaza Strip is currently interested in a lull. The rocket fire targeting Israel that is perpetrated by armed groups refusing to accept authority - including Fatah operatives - causes Israel to repeatedly close the border crossings and deprives Hamas of what it considers one of the main advantages of the lull: the removal of the blockade from Gaza. The Israeli government, which is also interested in a lull and is not heeding suggestions to respond militarily to every rocket, cannot, even from a political perspective, allow the crossings to remain open while the Negev is being shelled.

But if the rocket fire continues, a military response will eventually follow. The Hamas leaders realize this and don't want it. They have spoken out vehemently and unequivocally against the rocket fire, and one of the most radical Hamas leaders, Mahmoud Zahar, has even threatened those who violate the lull with arrest. Nonetheless, the rocket fire continues. Apparently the perpetrators are relying on Hamas' not allowing itself to backtrack on the statements its leaders have repeated recently, that even though a lull is currently in the Palestinian interest, Hamas will not function as Israel's policeman or turn its weapons on other Palestinian groups to defend Israel's security.

A government that starts off by promising competing groups of militants operating in its territory that it will not forcibly impose its authority has no chance of "convincing" those groups to obey. It does, however, have an excellent chance of finishing off just as the Fatah government ended its rule of Gaza: Those with whom it refrained from clashing, those it allowed to accumulate power under its nose will topple it at the right time. This is a long way from happening in Gaza, but the direction is clear. The multistory buildings from which Hamas operatives flung their Fatah rivals during the takeover of Gaza are still standing.

This slogan - we won't be Israel's policemen, we're not the South Lebanon Army - was adopted by Fatah in the early days of the Palestinian Authority, and more than anything else, this is what decided the fate of the Oslo process. It also decided the fate of the Fatah government in Gaza, and is now threatening its rule in the West Bank.

From Israel's perspective, this slogan disparages the principle of land for peace, since it promises that as long as Israel cedes land, it will get less peace - and that's regardless of the will of the Palestinian leadership. There were periods before September 2000 in which Yasser Arafat was interested in terror attacks, and then the slogan served only as an excuse. But there were also times when he wanted quiet, and this quiet was disturbed by his rivals. Senior Palestinian security officials realized the grave danger posed by the armed anarchy that had developed in the territories, and urged their leader to exert force. There were times when the PA did indeed prevent terror attacks, but it never made a systematic effort to disarm the militant groups or impose the basic rule without which no government can exist: a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has openly and courageously denounced the terror attacks and the armed struggle against Israel. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity, because such comments did nothing to improve his popularity when the prevailing assumption among Palestinians in the territories was that a few exploding buses would topple Israeli society. But even Abbas stuck to the approach that it was permissible to try to persuade those attacking Israel in contravention of the leadership's position that they should stop, and even to bother them here and there, but that the government should not confront them and certainly should not fight them - because after all, "we're not Israel's policemen."

Indeed, the Palestinian government should not be Israel's policeman. It shouldn't act against terrorism because of Israeli pressure, but of its own volition and for its own reasons. A national movement could have an interest in making peace, either in a truce or in war, but it is hard to imagine a situation in which operating as a collection of gangs would be in its interest. Of course, Israeli policy should also make it easier for the Palestinian leadership to impose its authority. But the Palestinian unwillingness to do so is not just a matter of weakness. It is connected not just to the occupation, but also to Israel's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public.

Nonetheless, the question of the attitude toward Israel is not, ultimately, the most important one. The primary issue is whether there will be a Palestinian leadership, whatever its ideology may be, that operates as a national leadership and as a government - one that polices itself.