Not at any price

The developing deal with Hezbollah for the return of three corpses and one citizen, in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, is not just faulty: It is a virtual scandal. Its symbolic import is problematic - it's as though our state assists a distorted mechanism that rewards the kidnapping of Israelis. Moreover, we undermine terrorists' motivation not to kill prisoners. The twisted message goes something like this: Israelis are so sensitive about their dead that it doesn't really matter to them whether hostages are returned dead or alive. In either case, they'll pay dearly for them.

During Israel's wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, we had control of over 18,000 prisoners, mostly Egyptians; we treated them in accord with the Geneva Convention, and we returned them in compliance with international law, without extortion. The same cannot be said of the Egyptians and Syrians, who tortured their prisoners. Egypt, for its part, never asked for its dead to be returned; and many of its war fatalities are buried throughout the Sinai Peninsula.

When terror organizations started to use hostages as negotiation leverage, Israel's policy was not to engage in negotiations with kidnappers, and not to make ransom payments for the release of hostages. Hijacking episodes involving the Air France plane to Uganda, the El Al plane to Algeria, and the Sabena plane to Tel Aviv ended without Israel surrendering to blackmail. After a TWA plane was hijacked and brought to Damascus, two Israelis were freed in exchange for the release of two Syrian pilots who had been held by us. The numbers in that last deal were one for one - a ratio we've long since forgotten.

Israel's policy did not always produce happy endings. In 1974, when Henry Kissinger started to organize a peace conference in Geneva, terror organizations renewed ransom attacks. That year, on May 15, a terror squad affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took over a school in Ma'alot, and demanded the release of hundreds of prisoners. A military operation aimed at liquidating the terrorists failed, and the results were grim: 24 fatalities, and 70 injured persons. Not a single pupil escaped unharmed.

The turning point came with the 1985 Jibril deal, in which 1,150 terrorists, including the most heinous murderers, were released in exchange for the return of three Israeli soldiers. After the deal was clinched, Yitzhak Rabin admitted that he couldn't stand up to the pressure exerted by parents. This Jibril deal provoked a public debate. Some unflattering grievances were aired about circumstances in which eight IDF soldiers had been captured (six of these had been returned two years earlier, in exchange for the release of 4,450 persons held in Lebanon's Ansar camp). Retired IDF officers and various commentators argued that Israel should adopt the principle of exchanging one prisoner for one prisoner, one corpse for one corpse. The trauma caused by the Jibril deal was exacerbated when it became clear that many of the released prisoners resumed terror attacks against Israel.

The Jibril deal taught the Arabs that Israel had a breaking point. It exposed Israel's Achilles Heel - namely, its sensitivity toward victims. Many believe that the deal prodded the eruption of the first intifada.

Israelis value the sanctity of human life, and so bringing their loved ones home is imperative to them. Yet this emotion must be balanced against tactical, operative calculations. Yitzhak Navon, who was the only minister who opposed the Jibril deal, stated at a government meeting that forbearance is needed to stand up to the families of captured men, and that there are lines which Israel cannot afford to cross. Apparently, this position is not upheld by Ariel Sharon who, according to one newspaper report, cried during a meeting with one of the parents.

Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and many security officials cling to Navon's view. If we assume, as the Vinograd report suggests, that Ron Arad is alive, then why should we release Dirani? If the assumption is that Ron Arad is not alive, then why release hundreds of prisoners without receiving his corpse, or at least information about his fate? If the deal's aim is to receive Elhanan Tennenbaum - who is no Eli Cohen, and who was not kidnapped while serving the state - then why aren't we releasing one prisoner, instead of hundreds, to obtain his freedom?

A wholly lopsided prisoner exchange deal bears psychological and practical implications. Hezbollah now comes across as the force which repulsed Israel from Lebanon. It assists Palestinian terror; and, unlike Arafat, the designated candidate for removal, Hezbollah does not recognize Israel's existence, and, with Iran's collaboration, is prepared to strike Israel. It would be wrong for us to turn Nasrallah into a regional leader and defender of the Palestinians, and concurrently turn every Israeli into a kidnapping target. This is an affair in which cool-minded rationality must rule, not emotion nor Sharon's bag full of tears. A body for a body, information for information, a prisoner for a prisoner. Nothing more.