Hundreds of thousands of starry-eyed Americans braved the bitter cold and the economic crisis to crowd the Mall in Washington, D.C., yesterday. They were joined by tens of millions more Americans who took off from work (at their own expense) to celebrate at home or in the streets, and to experience history in the making. They were motivated by a great hope and their towering optimistic character.
Ostensibly, this week Israelis also had a reason for joy and hope: the military victory that its leaders declared in high-flying language, a victory that is supposed to liberate them from the nightmare of rockets. But there is no joy in Israel: The people even in Netivot and Be'er Sheva did not take to the streets, entertainers did not make victory appearances in Ashdod and the Israel Defense Forces staged no triumphal parade in Ashkelon. Deep in their hearts, Israelis - all Israelis - feel no real reason for celebration.
Never mind the election-eve arrogance of politicians. But when the army also makes unsubstantiated statements like, "the goals have been attained," the IDF, that is to say all of us, has a problem. What goals, pray tell? Has Gilad Shalit returned home? Have most of the rockets been destroyed? Has Hamas' operational backbone been broken? Has its leadership been put out of commission? Can no more rockets be smuggled into the Gaza Strip, or be manufactured there? Are these not the goals for which we went into battle?
It's not every day that Israel can set out on an action this extensive, and in a relatively convenient international atmosphere, as during Operation Cast Lead. With the forces that were fielded, we could have, and should have, attained these goals in one fell swoop and inside a few days. But the results reveal that although there has been major improvement in terms of organization (training, logistics, coordination and control), in terms of the IDF's operational conceptions, it is still deeply mired in the mud of the failed concepts of the Second Lebanon War.
The operation opened with a stunning aerial blow, which, as in Lebanon, was not accompanied by an immediate ground operation. Thus the basic military principle of "utilizing achievements" was wasted. As in Lebanon, these unnecessary days of waiting allowed the enemy to recover from the shock, to redeploy and rescue their forces, and to increase the rate of rocket launches. When the IDF's ground forces were eventually used, instead of overrunning the enemy, they entered into sporadic battles at a slow and deliberate pace, although diplomatic time was running out.
Even this way, most of the goals could have been attained, but even when the army did go in, it acted mainly as a pulverizing force that cannot, because of its operational and psychological weight, chase and destroy elusive Hamas forces. (It is impossible to throw the enemy off balance with soldiers advancing 100 meters or less a day).
In short, as in Lebanon, the IDF, with its great resources and huge technological advantages, operated against an enemy strapped in numbers, equipment and fighting ability, with forces too huge and without operational flexibility. Feints, ruses and psychological warfare were used sparingly, if at all, and no significant special actions were carried out, despite the IDF's many commando units.
The nation feels that once again the sword has been sheathed too quickly. It is worried, and will make its statement at the ballot box. But what will happen to the IDF? Who will shake it up and extricate its senior command, before it is too late, from being mired long and deep in the mud of mediocrity?
