The fighting in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, which began three weeks ago, is nearing its end. Only a few days are left for the military campaign to transform the security situation and make it better after the firing grinds to a halt than it was before the fighting erupted.
Until now, the government's management of the campaign and the Israel Defense Forces operations have been difficult to understand and even disappointing. A thorough examination of the gap between the initial expectations and the extent to which they were fulfilled is essential for Israel to learn the lessons of the fighting and to improve its future conduct. However, the task at hand is making additional gains on the ground and strengthening Israel's negotiating position in the talks to shape our security relations with Lebanon. Failure to strive for such gains is liable to lead to a stinging defeat that will encourage extremist violence and weaken moderate elements in Arab states and Palestinian society. Such a development would also tell Israeli citizens who have spent weeks in shelters due to the Katyusha rockets or who were uprooted from their homes that their sacrifice was in vain.
The military campaign cannot be overly ambitious right now. It must serve the objectives defined at its start: damaging Hezbollah's military might; getting the Lebanese government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah's militia; creating a security buffer in southern Lebanon; and securing the release of the two IDF soldiers whom Hezbollah abducted, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. These objectives, which from the start were more limited than the public impression of a war to crush Hezbollah, will be achieved only in part.
Hezbollah's long-range rockets have mostly been destroyed, but no system has been created to prevent a renewed supply from Syria and Iran. If Hezbollah continues to hold weapons, that means that the international community will have admitted failure in implementing its decisions. A buffer zone in southern Lebanon would thwart surprise attacks on Israeli communities and troops along the border, but would not prevent Hezbollah from circumventing it with high-trajectory weapons. And while Israel would breathe a sigh of relief if Regev and Goldwasser were released in exchange for Lebanese prisoners, headed by Nahariya murderer Samir Kuntar, such a deal would also allow Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to celebrate the victory of having kept his promise.
The suspension of the aerial bombing, which was announced under American pressure after the deaths of Lebanese civilians in Qana and came as a surprise to the IDF, is not meant to keep Israel from attacking rocket launchers ready to fire or carrying out "targeted assassinations" of key Hezbollah operatives. The government did not commit to ceasing all fire, but only to stopping a single component of that fire - and even that, for only two days.
The challenge facing the IDF over the next few days is to take control of the areas due to be handed over to the Lebanese army, when it is finally sent to the south, and to the multinational force that is being established. The IDF must also attack the Hezbollah operatives who have been controlling those areas, so that they will not threaten the border again or pose an immediate risk to the Lebanese army or the multinational force. And finally, it must be on guard against Hezbollah's determination to cause further losses among Israeli civilians and soldiers. The extent of Israel's success in these tasks will influence the profit and loss account in this campaign - an account whose interim results are far from encouraging.
