Helping to impose order

The uprising in Gaza against the Palestinian Authority's institutions has gone on for three days. The reasons declared for the uprising is PA haplessness when it comes to guaranteeing the security and welfare of the residents of Gaza, along with profound corruption that characterizes the heads of the various Palestinian institutions. The demands by the participants in the uprising, who on Saturday kidnapped police commander Ghazi Jibali and four French civilians and on Sunday burned down the headquarters of the Palestinian Intelligence Services, are to get rid of the corrupt leaders and commanders, conduct thorough reforms in the PA institutions, and decentralize Yasser Arafat's powers.

Seemingly, this is a matter of dispute between the citizens of the PA and its leadership, not an Israeli affair. But this internal wrangling must be the cause of profound concern among those worried about the fate of the disengagement plan. That plan, even while it is defined as unilateral, should hope for a responsible Palestinian partner to undertake responsibility for managing the affairs of Gaza after the withdrawal. That is also why the prime minister made the effort to enlist the support of Egypt and Jordan for the plan, recognizing that those two countries will be needed to strengthen the PA control in Gaza.

The recent events in Gaza raise doubts about the ability of any central Palestinian authority in Gaza to control events, and therefore raises doubts about Egyptian and Jordanian readiness to join the disengagement plan when out-of-control organizations and splinter organizations are operating in the territory.

It may yet become apparent to Israel that it cannot shrug off the developments in Gaza. A complete collapse of the PA's institutions - to which Israeli policy has greatly contributed in the last four years - endangers the prime minister's only political initiative. Therefore, while Israel is not a party to the riots and certainly should not intervene in the domestic struggles, it must help the PA and particularly Arafat impose order in Gaza and reassert the power of the central Palestinian leadership. There should be no avoiding the possibility of allowing Arafat out of the Muqata to go to Gaza, to stabilize the situation there. In any case, according to the Egyptian initiative, Arafat will be the Palestinian partner for the consolidation of the disengagement plan.

In the absence of a central Palestinian security force in Gaza, Israel could find itself sinking deeper into the alleys of the Strip, because of the anticipation of more frequent attacks on Israeli settlements. The disengagement's opponents might adopt that as an excuse to freeze the plan, and as proof of their claims that the declaration of the plan is encouraging terror and the internal struggles in the PA. But it is precisely because of the situation that has developed that it is important to speed up the disengagement plan and get the settlers out of the firing zone that is Gaza. There is no reason to drag out the implementation of the plan for a year and a half and thus further endanger the lives of the 7.500 settlers, when the conditions still make possible a departure that is not under fire.