The renewed talks of final-status arrangement, land exchange, dividing Jerusalem, and the right of return, and the familiar faces of Abu Ala and Saeb Erekat with the documents and maps evoke a sharp sense of deja vu. As though nothing has happened since the failure of the peace process and the eruption of the intifada in the Fall of 2000. As though the political negotiations are being conducted in a parallel universe, cut off from reality.
But this is an illusion: the negotiations in the autumn of 2007 are being held in a very different political and strategic environment from those of the previous round.
First, the parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian final status arrangement - presented by former President Bill Clinton at the end of his term - fixated the framework for the conflict's solution in the international consciousness. Every agreement between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will be compared to Clinton's plan, to see who conceded and who gained.
Second, building the separation fence fixated in the consciousness of most Israelis the final border line in the West Bank. Yielding territories to the west of it, on the ridge controling Israel's population centers and water sources, would encounter strong internal resistance. The problem is that the fence, which dissects the West Bank into three enclaves, is far from the Palestinian minimum demands.
Third, the Gaza Strip's status has changed entirely. Now, Olmert and Abbas can decide whatever they wish about Gaza, knowing that it's unenforceable. Hamas will continue to be in charge there, and the Qassams will keep winging their way to Israel.
Fourth, the increased strength of Iran and its allies has changed for the worse the regional balance of power, and pushed the moderate Arab states - lead by Saudi Arabia - to look for tranquilizers for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Israel, this is a blessing and a curse. The Arab initiative hardens the Palestinian positions, but also promises normalization and regional integration in exchange.
Fifth, America is no longer as powerful as it was in the Middle East, following its hopeless entanglement in Iraq and President Bush's political decline. It is possible to defy it fearlessly, as Iran's president does. The truth is that American power was always limited vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue.
Sixth and most important, in Arafat's era the question was whether he really wanted an agreement, but there was no doubt that he was capable of carrying it out. The situation with Abbas and Salam Fayad is reversed: they mean well, but their implementation power is limited. Any agreement with them would be theoretical, at least until they "gain more power" and accept security responsibility.
All this indicates that Olmert and Abbas' mission is much harder than that of their predecessors Barak and Arafat.
Only the final, most serious issues remain open. There is no time left to waste on empty rhetoric. The changes in the region and the Palestinian leadership's weakness make it even more difficult to reach a viable agreement. It is clear that the Annapolis meeting will require much more creativity and daring than the previous session at Camp David.
