Meshing into the mainstream

A study published this week on the Foreign Policy Web site predicting that by 2030, secular Jewish Israelis would be a minority within the school system and the recruitment age-group, plays to the fears of an Israel that is swiftly descending into an abyss of religious sectarianism and fundamentalism.

The statistics are inarguable. Both the Haredi and the Arab communities have steadily been growing, and their higher birth rates seem to indicate that the trends are almost irreversible. You could argue that economic conditions would rapidly affect birth rates and conceivably, mass aliya from the West, or even emigration for some reason of Haredim or Arabs out of Israel, could alter the picture, but it hardly seems likely.

The weak point in the Foreign Policy study is not the validity of its forecast, but the lack of understanding it shows to the way Israeli society has been functioning over the past six decades. The dirty secret of Israeli demographics has always been that, save for a very short period immediately after the War of Independence, the Jewish, secular, Ashkenazi middle-class - the self-styled "founders" - was always a minority.

From the moment the waves of aliyah began arriving in the early 1950s, Israel was swamped by all manner of Jews of every color and hue from all corners of the globe. None of these groups had an easy time assimilating, and parts of them still exist today outside the mainstream. But the large majority, especially the younger generation who grew up in Israel, strived to join the "founders" and be like them.

Despite having a majority of citizens born, or descended from those born in North Africa and the Middle East, Israel is a westernized country with a predominantly Ashkenazi culture. And while a majority of Jewish Israelis respond to surveys by saying they are either religious, haredi or masorti (traditional), society is still essentially secular. The different groups influenced and colored society, but by and large were willingly co-opted into the mainstream.

The same thing is happening now, in front of our eyes with the million Jews who arrived over the 1990s from the former Soviet Union. Not all of them were well absorbed, some returned to Russia and the older generation still lives mainly in their own enclaves, but under the age of 40, successful integration seems to be the norm.

For the last 20 years we have been hearing about the preponderance of young national-religious men in the IDF's elite units, and junior- and medium-level officer ranks. Indeed, the army's social makeup has changed, but at the same time this process has also bound a large part of the religious community closer to the Israeli mainstream. Certainly, rabbis have a larger degree of influence today within the armed forces, just as kibbutz educators had in previous decades, and the affinity of many units with the religious settlers is undeniable, but fears of the army coming under the sway of anti-democratic ultra-right-wing rabbis were dispelled to a large degree in the disengagement four years ago. Only a small handful of religious soldiers and officers disobeyed orders and refused to participate in the evacuation of settlements, and there is little indication that it will be much different when the time comes to pull out of more parts of the West Bank.

A minority has coalesced into the Haredi-nationalist ("hardal") stream, which combines religious and nationalist fanaticism with disdain for secular decadence, and the battle for the souls of the young generation is still on. But the growing religious inclusion is not only in the military, but also in the fields of academia, business, media and culture.

What the Foreign Policy study does underline is the fact that Israeli society now faces a new and daunting challenge: Over the next two decades, it will have to find a way to accommodate two groups that have not chosen in the past to be part of the Israeli mainstream - indeed, in many ways they were excluded. Neither group automatically accepts the Zionist narrative, but they are here to stay.

Encouraging signs can already be seen within both communities. More Haredi young men are joining the army, not so much out of Zionism, but from an understanding that this is their best route into the job market. The ultra-Orthodox community is slowly beginning to realize that a "learner's society," financed by donations and government handouts, is simply not viable and the majority will have to give up all-day Torah study for job training. As larger numbers become exposed to the rest of society, more changes are inevitable.

Where Israeli Arabs are concerned, the challenge is much greater. On the margins (in the Druze and Bedouin communities) inroads have been made, including larger enlistment numbers and greater integration into the local economy. The beginnings of change are also visible in the wider Israeli Arab community, and 1,000 Arab youths joined the civil national service program over the past year.

But at the same time, the most progressive and secular elements of Arab society dismayed many Jewish Israelis this year with proposals for new civil charters, including demands for forgoing a major part of the country's Jewish identity. But this can also be seen as an encouraging sign, showing that a new generation of Israeli Arabs want to engage in mainstream society, and are confident enough in their own identity to approach it on their own terms.

And that's one of the difficult things about true integration - that it involves a two-way process of dialogue.

The Israel we end up with in 2030 may not quite fit the vision of the founding fathers of Zionism (if indeed they ever agreed on one definitive vision), but its ability to integrate and evolve will prove a longer-term strength than any kind of demographic certainty.