Lessons of War / Officers that are just execs
By Ze'ev SchiffIt's impossible not to be shocked by the conclusions drawn by the military task force investigating the senior commanders of Division 91, one of the Israel Defense Forces' most important divisions, and the way in which they ran this summer's Lebanon war. And it's impossible not to worry about how they were found to have brought failure upon themselves.
The irony is that beyond Hezbollah's role in causing the IDF's defeat, the army defeated itself with inefficiency and chaos caused through its logistics and operations. All told, it's a sad tale of a confused division during wartime.
It turns out that for 16 years, the IDF had not offered a course for division commanders. Following the war, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz ordered that such a course be given once again. Perhaps this lack of education contributed to the task force's findings that the senior officers were more military administrators than combat commanders who used military gibberish that other units had difficulty understanding.
The multiple serious malfunctions that took place - such as those following Hezbollah's abduction of soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev on July 12 - do not just turn up suddenly, but develop over time. All at once, the IDF looks like it's limping along.
Those looking for one key factor leading to the IDF's failures cannot escape the conclusion that the constant need to maintain security in the territories plays a negative role for any advanced army, turning the IDF into a type of large police force. The investigation of Division 91 turned up an army looking for reasons not to attack, whether due to a casualty here and there, a problem with the gas supply for a tank, or a bulldozer in its way.
The trend in the IDF today is not to raise even a hint of suspicion that the army is hiding anything in its investigations. Therefore, it decided to publicize most of the task force's findings, while exercising caution regarding sensitive security issues. There certainly will be enemies who rejoice at news of the IDF's shortcomings, but only the future will tell what this approach will do to Israel's deterrence ability.
A more important question is whether these failures can be fixed. Most of the critics say that's possible. The IDF is now approaching the important stage of drawing conclusions from the inquiries, and we must assume that the army will carry out this phase the right way. What is not yet clear is whether the IDF and its senior commanders will also be able to straighten what has been deformed and head in a new direction.
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although its important to learn to improve, which the IDF is certainly doing, its more important that positive change takes place. i recall in the army, one of my commanders told me there is a culture in the army -- he was from egoz -- called "ke'ilu". so, if all that happens is that the magadim course becomes a procedural joke and conclusions are only superficially implemented, then what is there to gain by going through all of this airing of dirty laundry. i vividly recall one of the ops officers for egoz was a certifiable moron with no combat experience...and he was planning the missions! i mean come on. it really bothered me to hear that golani (including egoz) soldiers were lost because patzan had not relayed important intel. whats the point of having soldiers be kicked out of egoz for failing security checks if they are denied the intel they are entitled to? i could go on. but why?
Thats not "firing from a safe distance". There was poor intelligence,preparation and coordination. The Israeli soldiers were prepared to fight and when they are prepared to fight they are prepared to die. They were let down. Despite the propoganda this war was clearly NOT planned in advance by Israel. Israeli action was reactive.
No regular army can beat a popular resistance. The targets that were set by the politicians were not achievable in the first place. Even if the IDF had succeeded to cause more severe casualties to the Hezbollah infrastructure it would not have been able to eliminate Hezbollah nor the missiles threat. The only solution is political. Israel must settle for Peace. Real peace with real concessions....not cheap talk like the speeches of Mr Olmert !
Maybe Israel needs Chuck to help them.
Z rejoices in the fact that 33 years ago,idf in pitched tank battle,against army of poor 3rd world country,won decisively.i suppose for less glorious episodes of same war,from which zadok was far away, we also say halleluya.why is this so pathetragic?cos here we are 33 years later,in the very same rut&rot.still in war,colonization,no normalcy in sight.ergo schiff discusses minutea.idf is presently one party of many,in a 100 year conflict.this conflict cannot be WON by israel.there is no REALISTIC scenario in which schiff can say:this is israeli victory(presumably achieved by force of arms-he being a military expert).this conflict can only be SETTLED.so a victory in tel-khara,or a tragic oops in ras el nakeb,matter only to the families of dead/disabled.continuation of violence will terminate israel,if we think in centuries,rather than next week.that's what some great soldiers say post-discharge:no military solution.you say the same when you concoct fantastic schemes to evade prime issue
was the anniversary of the armoured battle that took place in 1973.in mobile warfare against the egyptians in sinai israel destroyed over 200 egyptian tanks for the loss of a very few of ours.that is what with G-D'S help israel is capable of doing.
The reason Israel lost the war was because they were not willing to take the losses required for a victory. Israel began the war by attacking Hizbollah targets with artillery and air power for 1 week. The army expected to go in and mop up. Instead they met withering fire from Hizbollah, losing men and tanks in the process. The IDF then fell back and fired at Hizbollah from a distance in order to avoid taking more casualties. The IDF could certainly have beaten Hizbollah, but an army that hesitates to approach the enemy due to taking casualties is doomed to fail. This is the same problem that the Americans have in Iraq.