Analysis / A matter of timing

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's latest threat to strike at Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat came at a convenient time for all the parties involved.

It is convenient for Sharon, who must present a hard line ahead of the Likud referendum on the disengagement and prove to his party members that he is not a sucker who caves in to terror and retreats from Gaza under fire.

It is convenient for Arafat, who loves the role of victim and martyr and uses it to enlist renewed support from the Palestinian public.

And it is also convenient for the American administration, which wants to show its Arab and European friends that it can restrain the "neighborhood bully" and does not automatically support Sharon's every bullying whim.

Sharon has refrained from threatening Arafat since the cabinet's decision in September 2003 to remove the Palestinian leader "in the way, time and manner which will be determined." He rekindled the issue in Pesach interviews, in which he first announced he was releasing himself from his promise to U.S. President George Bush not to harm Arafat physically.

Over the weekend, Sharon said in an interview on Channel 2 that he had said as much to Bush. Despite the transparent timing of Sharon's announcement - as part of the steps leading up to the withdrawal from Gaza and part of the West Bank, and the referendum among Likud members - it should not be mistaken for a momentary whim. Sharon has been talking of his desire to get rid of Arafat for the past two years. He has expressed public regret for not killing Arafat in the Lebanon War. Experience shows that such contingency plans tend to be carried out, when the correct circumstances arise.

Sharon's main problem is the American objection. Israel has gradually raised the scale of assassinations of senior Palestinians, and the killing of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi passed relatively calmly. The United States has never asked Israel to promise to spare them, and only asked Israel "to consider the implications of its actions." Arafat was kept out of bounds, protected by the Americans, who claimed that killing him would inflame the region and grossly interfere with U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Sharon persuaded the administration that there was no point in talking to Arafat, but the Americans prefer to push him into a corner, isolated and cloistered in the Muqata in Ramallah, and object to removing him forcibly.

These restraints may loosen under certain conditions, especially if a serious terrorist attack occurs that can be tied to Arafat, for instance, it the Tanzim is held responsible. In that case, pressure would mount in Israel to implement the resolution to remove Arafat. The political timing would be critical - for example, if Bush loses the presidential elections in November and the administration enters a transition period of two and a half months until his successor enters office.

Such transition periods are known as a gray zone in which both parties can test the limits of their relations. For example, in 1960, the Americans took advantage of the transition period to expose the Dimona nuclear project. In 1988, the U.S. opened a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization, to Israel's chagrin. In 1992, the Rabin government deported hundreds of Hamas people to Lebanon. In 2000, Israel transferred a missile warning radar, for fear the new administration would veto the deal.

Arafat will probably be in danger if for some reason Sharon has to quit office; he will be loath to return to Sycamore ranch with his old enemy still in power. In this case, Sharon may prefer to carry out his threat, knowing there is nothing the U.S. can do to him. The Israeli argument - that as long as Arafat is in office, Israel is "exempt" from negotiating on the final status agreement - will no longer interest Sharon on his way out.

The suggestion to assassinate Arafat is controversial. Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has expressed enthusiastic support for it in the past. Shin Bet head Avi Dichter evaluated that killing Arafat was better than deporting him. Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon objected, fearing that assassinating Arafat would turn him into a martyr and it is therefore better to ignore him and continue "killing him softly."

But these are only theoretical scenarios at the moment. In the Prime Minister's Bureau they made it clear yesterday that Sharon was serious, but no attack on Arafat should be expected in the near future. As on previous occasions, the threat on Arafat will be put back in the drawer until next time.