Amos Harel / IDF's idea of 'proportionate' is a matter of interpretation

The five detailed Israel Defense Forces investigations into Operation Cast Lead reflect a meticulous focus on the trees, and a stubborn refusal to discuss the forest. The probes lasted three months, and were thorough and extensive, but they failed to give convincing answers to some substantive issues regarding the Gaza offensive.

For more than two hours, a group of senior officers presented the findings to the media. The IDF has many good responses for the accusations, some of which came from Hamas and the UN and were proven wrong. In other instances, mistakes caused civilian deaths, but even in the case of 21 family members killed due to faulty intelligence, it is commonly accepted that these kinds of mistakes occur during fighting in difficult environments.

The following are some of the problems:

Even the IDF admits that at least 295 civilians were killed, mostly women and children, and 162 others whose identity is not clear. International groups claim that at least twice that number of civilians were killed. The reports indirectly acknowledge the killing of several dozen civilians. How did the rest die? Obviously in war time, there is a great deal of collateral damage. But this is not a good enough answer.

The explanation probably lies in the means used during the operation. The IDF is proud of its extensive use of precision munitions. However, when a one-ton bomb is dropped into a densely populated area - of mostly poorly constructed houses - even a strike three meters off target will cause massive casualties.

Moreover, in addition to the fire from the air, massive ground firepower was used. Tank rounds fired in the middle of Gaza killed civilians, as did sophisticated mortar shells (a mortar shell with an accuracy of 50 square meters is not a "precision weapon," no matter what the IDF claims).

True, measures were taken: millions of leaflets were dropped, and some 165,000 calls were made to Gaza homes, but this does not ensure that the civilians will run, or that they will be protected when they enter open terrain. The army stressed that it fired phosphorus munitions only in "open areas," but did not define this term. Conversations with artillery and infantry troops who participated in the operation suggest that the definitions were fairly loose, and that the required distance from civilian homes became shorter as fighting continued.

Was the destruction of homes "proportionate," as the probes suggest? That's a matter of interpretation. Some of the legal experts who participated in the probe did not think so, and two infantry officers who held key positions during the fighting acknowledged, "We just leveled neighborhoods."

There is no dispute: The enemy in the Gaza Strip is evil, and was cynical about exploiting civilians. True, the IDF killed fewer civilians than other armies have in similar circumstances, but the death of hundreds of Palestinian civilians occurred because the army (and the political leadership) felt it was important to complete the operation with minimal Israeli losses. In Gaza, the doctrine was "zero risk" to soldiers' lives, even when this meant harming enemy civilians.

A senior officer said Wednesday that he "refuses to apologize for having lost only 10 soldiers in the Gaza Strip," and claimed, "In Gaza we operated according to the IDF spirit."

But there are brigade commanders arguing (quietly, so that the chief of staff won't hear) that the rules of engagement were excessive and lenient. Not all the officers believe the basic assumption that extra consideration for Palestinian civilian lives means losing soldiers.