The sorcerer has no apprentice

Apparently it's an infectious disease - the inability of the heads of the intelligence community to prepare deputies to replace them when the time comes.

It started with Mossad chief Meir Dagan, and now Yuval Diskin, the head of the Shin Bet security services, seems to have the same syndrome. Last week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked Diskin to extend his term for a year. Diskin agreed. He has been Shin Bet chief since May 2005. According to the 2002 Shin Bet law, the service of its head should not exceed five years though the cabinet, "under special circumstances," can extend it to a sixth, year. That means Diskin will step down in May 2011. Netanyahu explained his request by citing the security and intelligence challenges Israel is facing and stressed the contribution to be had from the chief's experience and skills.

No one disagrees that Diskin is one of the best Shin Bet chiefs. He is blessed with the qualities of an authoritative leader whose subordinates follow willingly because of his charisma. He is a reliable manager who grew with the job, shaking off previous signs of arrogance and too much self-confidence.

The Shin Bet has had numerous achievements in its day-by-day struggle against Palestinian terrorism during Diskin's term. Moreover, he supplied information to the Israel Defense Forces, sometimes in real time, that enabled the military to carry out pinpoint preventive attacks, especially during the last war in Gaza. While he expanded the research department so the Shin Bet's point of view would be broader and influence policy, in other fields he actually showed a narrower perspective, which is not what one expects from a senior officer with influence in the defense establishment.

There are two especially irritating issues. One is his lack of readiness to challenge the government and demand a change in the excessive and wasteful protection of detail provided to ministers. The second is his silence (and lack of intervention) concerning the humiliations Israeli Arabs undergo at crossing points, at the hands of the security screeners of the Airports Authority. The Airports Authority always explains and justifies its actions by claiming that they receive professional guidelines from the Shin Bet. However, the Shin Bet knows perfectly well that humiliating Israeli Arab citizens can only aggravate the situation and turn loyal citizens into potential subversive elements.

Under Diskin's leadership, the Shin Bet has been built into a modern organization that has assimilated advanced technological tools such as wiretapping devices used to foil terrorism. But, inside and outside the organization, they say he was not wise enough to build up a new generation of leaders and commanders to replace him. He did not do the minimum required, as his predecessors, Ami Ayalon and Avi Dichter, did.

Ayalon and Dichter chose two of their subordinates (from many senior officers) as possible candidates and gave them equal opportunity to compete for the top job. Diskin himself benefited from just such an opportunity. He was an adviser on terror to Dagan and later Dichter's deputy. Ariel Sharon, when he was prime minister, preferred him to his competitor, Ofer Dekel.

Netanyahu's chief argument for keeping Diskin on was that no suitable new leader had risen from the ranks of the Shin Bet. But new leaders have to be allowed to spring up. So far Diskin has not made this possible.

Three senior officers in the Shin Bet consider themselves potential candidates for the coveted job when it is becomes available in another year and a half. One is D, Diskin's deputy, who heads the staff division. Another is D, who represents the organization in Washington, and there is Y, who spent a year at a Washington think tank and now is in charge of special projects. The lack of sufficient time until Diskin retires increases the chance that there is a good chance the next Shin Bet chief will come from the ranks of the IDF.

It is difficult to understand a sensible man like Diskin on this matter. Everyone knows this is not good for the organization. Is there subconscious fear of appointing an heir while he is still in the job? Or perhaps Diskin learned this from Dagan when he worked with him for a year and a half and with whom he has seen eye-to-eye on almost every issue in the past five years.

Back at the Mossad

Meanwhile, Dagan sends a clear but cynical message - there is no one in the organization worthy of replacing me. When all is said and done, Dagan is a good Mossad chief. His biggest achievement is rehabilitating the Mossad and giving it back its glory as an organization that strikes fear among Israel's enemies and wins admiration from its friendly counterparts. Dagan's tenure has not seen publication of embarrassing mistakes (as happened under previous leaders) though there certainly have been mistakes. The assassination of Hezbollah's "defense minister" Imad Mughniyeh has been attributed to the Mossad as a great success. Other achievements in the field of intelligence gathering are also credited to Dagan though some of the campaigns began with his predecessor, Ephraim Halevy, and are only now coming to fruition.

What is most irritating is Dagan's crass and disparaging attitude toward subordinates, his arrogance toward them and his inability to create good working relations. Like a cow that kicks over the pail in which its milk is collected, Dagan caused the resignation of both deputies he had chosen. N, head of the division responsible for running agents, was dismissed in an embarrassing fashion, shortly after he took over the post. Dagan ordered an investigation against his deputy, which included bugging his phone calls and those of his associates, only to discover he had leaked information to the media and thus dismissed him. And then there was T, who headed the operational direcorate. He was on a study leave when Dagan called him back after N's dismissal. When T realized this year that Dagan had no intention of retiring so quickly and would not commit to recommending T as his successor, T retired. Since then, despite the tradition of appointing a deputy, Dagan has not done so.

It is true that Dagan's new protege, R, the new chief of the operational directorate, is currently considered No. 2 in the organization. He comes from an operational background, so pleasing to Dagan, an enthusiast of plots and deception. But he has no official title as deputy. It seems that Dagan is incapable of appointing one (and R is not considered ready yet). It is not impossible the next Mossad head will also come from the outside and be another ex-general.