The defense system we should have

The State Comptroller's Report contains hundreds of pages about the country's failure to deploy against chemical weapons and missile threats, including a short but important - and very incisive - reference to the Vulcan Phalanx system. The report criticizes the defense establishment's foot-dragging in deploying the system to protect the south, even though experts agree it could be effective against Qassam rockets and could provide "a solution for protecting strategic sites."

The Vulcan Phalanx is a U.S.-made gun that the U.S. Army uses against steep trajectory rockets and mortar shells in Iraq and Afghanistan. The system includes detection radar, tracking radar and two 20-millimeter cannons.

According to the comptroller's report, the Israel Air Force and the Defense Ministry's R&D department (Mafat) conducted tests to examine the system's feasibility. A team from across the defense establishment determined at the time, "The Vulcan Phalanx system is likely to provide a solution for protecting strategic sites."

In December 2004, Mafat received basic data regarding the system's efficacy against Qassam rockets. About a year later, in January 2006, the air force determined it was the best-developed system to protect against mortar shells and rockets. In spite of that, nothing was done.

In early July 2007, Defense Minister Ehud Barak asked Mafat head Shmuel Kern to "examine, with the Israel Defense Forces, whether we could have a parallel effort (to the development of the Iron Dome) to get an operational system within a year and a half that could partially intercept steep-trajectory rockets with an emphasis on strategic installations, such as the power station (in Ashkelon), and a check regarding Sderot."

Several weeks later, Mafat replied that it had only partial information. Yet despite that, Barak determined that the Vulcan Phalanx is "the only system that is ready and could protecting specific sites, even though the protection of Sderot will involve security risks, environmental damage and very high costs."

But the officials and the senior officers ignored Barak. Despite his decision, and the incessant firing of rockets on Gaza border communities, and in spite of the fact that this system is used by the U.S. Army, Mafat, Defense Ministry Director General Pinhas Buchris and IAF officers continued behaving as if they had all the time in the world. They checked, met with U.S. officials and formed committees.

In April 2008, the Americans said they would provide Israel with the Vulcan Phalanx, but said Israel had to write a request letter. The Defense Ministry did not send the letter. Three months later, it sent a letter asking "to receive additional information" instead.

In short, like the major issues regarding missile protection that are discussed in the comptroller's report - Rafael's Iron Dome and Magic Wand initiatives - when it comes to the Vulcan Phalanx, the report paints a gloomy picture of the Defense Ministry and IDF's behavior. The bottom line is that the tail is wagging the dog. Defense Ministry officials - Director General Pinhas Buchris, Kern and senior IDF officials, especially in the IAF, do almost whatever they please. They don't bring plans for government approval. If they want, they ignore the ministers' instructions, procrastinate, allocate budgets without approval, and approve work plans for developing billion-shekel defense systems.

The report leaves the reader with the impression that the welfare and protection of the south's residents is the last thing that interests them. They seem to be more interested in defending their own decisions, covering for their colleagues and promoting the narrow interests of the defense industries. It should be noted that there is frequently a revolving door between Mafat and these industries.

It's true that the state comptroller did not examine the experts' debate on how many Vulcan Phalanx systems are necessary to protect Sderot. Mafat has said at least 10, while independent experts say three or four.

But even if the comptroller accepts Mafat's working assumption, he explicitly states that "in light of the threat that steep-trajectory rockets and mortar shells pose to critical and strategic sites, and given the anticipated date for the completion and future acquisition of the Iron Dome system, and now that three years have passed since the IAF began its feasibility examination, everyone involved should speed up the work and decision-making processes, so that if the system can be acquired and we decide to do so, it can be operational as quickly as possible."

In less refined language, the comptroller actually intends to tell the Defense Ministry and the IDF what has already been written here and in other places in the past: Stop futzing around. Make a decision, acquire the system, put in into operation. In a properly run country, those responsible for the failures, the irregularities, the improper procedures, the incorrect decisions and the foot-dragging - first and foremost Buchris, Kern, Mafat R&D head Daniel Gold and the air force commanders - would resign, and if not, they should be fired.