When Prime Minister Ehud Olmert returns from the United States he will convene the cabinet to discuss, once again, how to crack the code, the clashing parts of which are Gilad Shalit, border crossings and the cease-fire. Hamas is prepared for a tahadiyeh - a truce that would perhaps stop the rocket fire and bring relief to tens of thousands of people in Sderot and the communities of the Gaza envelope. But this would also end the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip and allow the organization to lick its wounds, gather strength and rearm. Israel's other problem is that Hamas is not prepared for the agreement to include the release of Gilad Shalit.
The top military and government decision-makers in Israel are trying to make up their minds. They know that if a truce is declared and they open the border-crossings to the Gaza Strip without Shalit's release, a rare opportunity will be missed and who knows when it will come around again, if at all. Moreover, postponing Shalit's release will not only endanger his life but will also cost Israel a higher price in the number of prisoners it will have to release later.
The internal debate among the decision-makers in Israel is channeled into a number of issues: Should Shalit's release be seen as a matter of national priority or as a tactical issue? Prime Minister Olmert has in effect already decided. Shortly after Shalit was taken prisoner he said that Israel would conduct negotiations with Hamas, and despite considerable opposition, he persuaded the cabinet to agree to paying a "price" of 450 Palestinian prisoners for him.
The debate on this issue heated up even more from December 2007, to February 2008, when the cabinet discussed the names of those who would be released, from a list that Hamas submitted. At the conclusion of the discussions, a list of 70 terrorists was approved, some of whom fit the definition of "with blood on their hands." On this list were terrorists who had abetted terror attacks that culminated in the deaths of Israelis but who had not carried out the attacks themselves. There were also elderly prisoners and people who had murdered Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel.
However, Israel strongly objects to the release of terrorists who have murdered Israeli civilians, including those who were involved in the horrific attacks on the bus to Jerusalem, the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv, the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem and the Park Hotel in Netanya.
But Hamas, too, is not immune to disputes that are delaying the negotiations. Hamas has adopted a method in which decisions are taken mainly by consensus. This is to "avoid mistakes." Khaled Meshal, the head of the political bureau, is considered the first among equals, but the consensus system is making it difficult for him to impose his opinion as supreme leader. The system makes it possible for a single vote to impose a veto, which prevents the acceptance of a decision, or leads to its rejection. In effect, Hamas has not authorized any central figure to conduct the negotiations. The significance of this is that it forces Israel and Egypt, which is mediating between the sides, to work vis-a-vis a number of Hamas factions.
There is the "outside" Hamas headed by Meshal in Damascus. There is the "inside" Hamas in Gaza, ostensibly headed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. In fact, however, it is split between political activists and religious activists who are stirring the pot to influence the leadership and the process. Alongside all of these, there is the military wing headed by Ahmed Jabri, which ostensibly is subordinate to Meshal but is in fact an independent entity. As in any organization, there are struggles in Hamas over prestige, influence, power and ego, and when one activist gains exposure to the public and prestige, this arouses envy, complaints and neutralizing counterreactions.
Add to all this the Iranian influence. Even though Hamas sees itself as an independent Sunni organization and is not keen to embrace "the Iranian bear," money from Tehran has a dynamic of its own.
The fact is that Hamas is leery of deciding on the Shalit issue, as this would force the organization's leadership to make a decision along the lines of a "Solomon's choice." Deciding in favor of a deal would release only a few hundred Palestinian terrorists and leave thousands in prison. Because the release of prisoners is a major "value in Palestinian society," Hamas is afraid to find itself the subject of criticism and rage from the families of those not released.
Finally, there are those in Hamas who say Shalit should not be released in ay case because he is perceived as a human shield against an Israeli invasion of Gaza. To all the difficulties that Israel and Hamas are facing must be added the problems of the Egyptian mediation. Egypt has an agenda of its own, at the center of which are the problems of its economy and society, on the backdrop of soaring food prices. Despite all its concern about the emergence of a Muslim Brotherhood entity on its border, Gaza does not have the most pressing claim on Egypt's attention. And the problem of one Israel soldier who has fallen prisoner is of even less interest.
