Aluf Benn

The critical mass of domestic interests and international pressures that will bring about the revival of a peace process with Syrian has not yet evolved.

If Israel justifies its existence and by doing so becomes a party to the debate, it may legitimize it. But despite the silence, the calls to destroy Israel are not dying out and the debate on them is just growing stronger.

It is exasperating to hear European foreign ministers talking about "Israel's right to exist" as if it were being put to the test. Who's asking them? Will an Israeli foreign minister ever talk about France or Germany's "right to exist"?

The recent series of successes by the PM - the release of Azzam Azzam, the victory in the Likud Central Committee, his rising popularity - is all the result of his "management," which is based on patience and demonstrating that he keeps his cool in crises.

The leaders of both sides will need a great deal of political will and ability in order to jump over the potholes of suspicion and lack of trust and lead the dialogue toward genuine results. When the time for unilateral gestures ends and the bargaining begins, this will be no easy task.

For years the governments of Israel have tried to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly on the grounds that they reflect the "automatic majority" that supports the Palestinians and that the majority is not necessarily right.

It is difficult imagining a Palestinian leadership that accepts a permanent agreement with a divided state in part of the West Bank. It is also difficult to imagine Sharon accepting full withdrawal, or nearly full withdrawal, from the territories.

Uzi Dayan has accused the government of protracted dysfunction since only one-third of the fence has been completed, even though a year has passed since the cabinet decided on the fence's route.

As long as Arafat was in power, it was possible to bridge the contradiction with the tactical explanation about the absence of a partner. With Abbas, a legitimate partner in Sharon's eyes as well, that will be a lot more difficult.

The United States wants to show more involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena after the presidential elections, with the friendly encouragement of the Europeans and the Arabs.

By the nature of their vocation, members of the intelligence community tend toward conspiracy theories. In their world, every published report is necessarily the handiwork of a vested interest who has leaked the information for a purpose.

It is not within the power of the IDF to bring about a solution or a fundamental change, when all around millions of people in the Arab and Muslim world are being educated to believe that Israel is to blame for all their trials and tribulations.

It will soon be the first anniversary of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement initiative - and the circumstances of its conception and birth remain clouded in mystery.

As we enter the fifth year of the intifada, the war has become the existential situation of the Israelis and the Palestinians. No one is talking about an end to the confrontation, only about a mutual "exacting of a price."

A possible attack on Iran will be complex and risky, and therefore we would do well not to ignore the threats, and to conduct a public debate on the question of whether this course of action is desirable for Israel.

Anyone who believes Sharon and wishes to see the bulldozers rise on Gush Katif should not holler afterward "I didn't know", when confronted by Arafat's corpse and the new neighborhoods in the settlements.

In honor of Rosh Hashanah, here's some advice for Bashar Assad: When you really want peace and a diplomatic breakthrough, come and talk to us. Yes, pack up Foreign Minister Farouk Shara and the maps of the Golan, and invite yourself to Jerusalem. Like Sadat.

Israel has learned an important lesson. It turns out that even unilateral moves under the heading "security and not political," as it were, are not implemented in a vacuum.

Israel's major failure is not in the way it is conducting its struggle against Arafat the man, but in the way it copes with Arafat the symbol.

Sharon understands the danger and portrays his disengagement plan as a last-ditch battle against the pressure to drive Israel back to the 1967 borders, a deal to save the West Bank at the cheap price of Gaza. In the coming months it will become evident if his gamble succeeded or if it was too late, and Israel will then face an international political collapse that makes irrelevant the domestic debate over the settlements.