"during the six years since the IDF pullout from southern Lebanon Israel adopted a strategy of choice along its northern front. This strategy involved a mistaken mix of defensive goals and defensive means, instead of defensive goals and offensive means, which would have been both wiser and justified." - Oren For a military reporter like Oren, this article is shamefully blind. The blindness concerns the "choice" issue in the recent war (as mentioned in my post #58), and extends back to the choices following the Barak withdrawl from southern Lebanon in May 2000. There was one more choice which was the top one on the Barak agenda: making peace with Syria. And a peace with Syria would have put an end to the Hizballah militia. (This choice is still available, if Israel wants to avoid another war in Lebanon, with many happy returns.) Barak was engage in a peace process with both Syria and the Palestinians. When one track was slow, he pursued the other track. Barak could have concluded a deal with the Syrians at Shepherdstown (Jan 2000) but got cold feet and preferred to prolong the process. The Syrians thought he was playing with them and went slow on him. (Hafez Assad was also dying, until June 2000, and got busy with the successions business.) Instead, Barak pulled out of Lebanon and turned to the Palestinian track and Camp David. We can blame Barak for the way he conducted himself, but as far as Lebanon he knew it would ultimately be taken care of by the peace with Syria. We can do it today too.
Suspected assailant in car-ramming attack in West Bank shot (Haaretz)
from the article: Was it a war of choice?