The destruction of Bedouin wheat fields in the northern Negev on February 14, by order of National Infrastructures Minister Avigdor Lieberman, brought to mind a telephone conversation I had with a Bedouin soldier on January 10, the morning on which three other Bedouin soldiers were killed near the Gaza Strip, but before the news was broadcast.
The soldier with whom I spoke has been serving in the Israel Defense Forces for 11 years, but on that day, he called me, who had led him to enlist, to tell me of his decision to quit.
"I've had it", he said, and explained that the Israeli authorities had rejected his request to lease and work the plot of land that his family had been cultivating for generations. "I can stand up to Arab accusations that I'm a traitor to the Palestinian cause," he continued, "but I can't take government officials treating me like an enemy. I risk my life for the state, and don't deserve this disdain."
This Bedouin soldier is a non-political individual, who has always viewed the performance of his tracking duties for the army as a matter of honor, conscious that the safety of Jewish troops patrolling behind him depended on his alertness. His willingness to serve and his subsequent alienation are a metaphor for the tragedy of our relations with the Bedouin in general.
Like him, all Bedouin were traditionally a non-political people, disinclined to follow political ideas or groups that might commit them to action not conducive to their tenuous existence. During the British Mandate, out of a Negev population numbering 65,000, the Bedouin that joined the ranks of Palestinian nationalism could be counted on the fingers of two hands.
Even following decades of Israeli policy that denied them ownership of their traditional lands, confiscated their flocks and forced them off the Negev expanses into seven townships, where half of them are now concentrated, the Bedouin did not translate their dismay into disloyalty.
This, however, is changing rapidly. The Bedouin, largely unprepared for living and supporting themselves in a semi-urban setting, now realize that we built their townships with little concern for their economic or social welfare. The education that their children receive is the weakest in the country, while their unemployment and poverty are at the highest national levels. And those who refused to enter the townships have been denied basic services such as electricity, running water, clinics, and schools.
The resultant alienation has caused the ranks of Bedouin in the army to dwindle quickly. The young do not volunteer; and the veterans are quitting.
In light of this loss to the army, one would expect the government to seriously adopt a corrective and friendlier policy. Or, at least, one would expect it to refrain from aggravating relations, as Avigdor Lieberman did by destroying Bedouin crops last week.
As the director-general of the Prime Minister's Office under Benjamin Netanyahu, Lieberman became a disciple of the anti-Bedouin gospel of then agriculture minister Rafael Eitan.
Planning to intensify an already-harsh government policy of driving the Bedouin out of the desert with his ministry's so-called Green Patrol, Eitan began advocating the disbandment of the army's Bedouin unit, so as to disarm its soldiers lest they raise their weapons in anticipated defense. Lieberman, using the Prime Minister's Office as a platform, echoed Eitan's call, loudly proclaiming that the Bedouin were "conquering" state-owned lands.
What Lieberman failed to take into account is that Negev Bedouin traditionally plant wheat in the winter. It is the basis of 80 percent of their diet. Yes, they consider the land they work as theirs, just as the government deems it state land. If there were any will on the part of the government to compromise, rather than resort to Draconian laws and force to expropriate these lands, amicable solutions could be found.
With a bit of good will, too, Lieberman could have leased the land to planters for six months, thereby safeguarding the government's claims against "squatters'" rights. Instead, the minister decided to show them who's boss.
It won't help the army to lose Bedouin trackers; and it won't help the state to lose Bedouin friendship. A responsible prime minister must act so as not to lose either.
The writer is a research fellow at the Truman Institute for Peace, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and has studied Bedouin culture and history for many years.