Subscribe to Print Edition | Thu., June 19, 2008 Sivan 16, 5768 | | Israel Time: 22:31 (EST+7) web haaretz.com   Back to Homepage Rosner's Domain Diplomacy Defense Jewish World Opinion National Print Edition Car Rental Books Peres Conference Business Real Estate Easy Start Travel Week's End Anglo File

Playing chicken in Gaza By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff Tags: gaza On its border with the Gaza Strip, Israel has been conducting what has in effect become one of the longest "hold me back" games in the region's history. For more than two years now the sides have hardly budged. The two discussions last week, one in the "kitchen cabinet" and the other in the full cabinet the following day, apparently did not deviate from the general trend. They reinforced the public's impression that we are supposedly facing momentous decisions when it comes to Gaza, without our having changed course in the slightest. Israel is determined to threaten Hamas. Implementation is a different matter entirely. The statement concluding Wednesday's cabinet meeting sounded a bit dramatic: We are giving the Egyptian truce (tahadiyeh) initiative another chance, while at the same time preparing for war. But what difference is there in Israel's stance today, compared to its stance a year or even two years ago? It is just the explanations that have been replaced. Once it was fear of a war with Syria, while on another occasion the cloudy weather was blamed, and yet another time it was the deal for the return of abducted Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit, which is taking its time in coming to fruition. Shalit, incidentally, is beginning to look like the ultimate excuse. In the space of less than two weeks, his fate has been used twice, to justify completely contradictory positions. First it was argued that there cannot be a truce without a commitment for his return. This week, quite a different argument was heard: It is necessary to reach a tahadiyeh to establish the conditions that will set the stage for his release. Advertisement The bottom line has remained the same: Absent a hit by a "strategic Qassam" that exacts many casualties in Israel and leads to massive escalation, no large-scale military offensive is expected in Gaza in the coming months (which in effect means, until the Knesset election). In the longer term, a direct clash with Hamas is definitely a possibility. But this, as noted, will take time. In collective memory, the current round in Gaza began with Shalit's abduction, on June 25, 2006, about nine months after the disengagement. In fact, Qassam rockets were already being fired into the Negev during the final stages of the Gaza withdrawal, in September 2005 (Hamas had stopped firing for a few months prior to the disengagement, "so as not to interfere with the Jews' retreat"). However, government spokespeople did a fine job of downgrading the rockets' importance. The media, which no doubt couldn't decide whether this was a parting shot before the pullout or the first shot after it, quickly lost interest. They were awakened abruptly by Shalit's abduction. The difficulties faced by the communities in the Gaza envelope are profound and there is no immediate solution to them. In these circumstances, it is important for the political and security establishment to spread the message that much is being done and to reassure the public of civilians and voters. The uncomfortable truth is buried under mountains of verbiage: "We are very close to a crucial juncture," "The military strike in Gaza is more imminent than ever" (Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, respectively, a week ago); the kitchen cabinet meets "under a blackout"; the cabinet "is seriously discussing the possibilities." The media tends to accept the official line almost literally. Thus, when Olmert and Barak are creating the impression that a major IDF move is imminent, the press rarely voices the basic, instinctive suspicion that if Israel has already been hesitating for two years now, it apparently has good reasons not to make good on its threats. Fudging a war A media riot broke out in the U.S. at the end of May, when Scott McClellan's book was published. McClellan was the White House press secretary during part of the Iraq war. In "What Happened," he describes how the Bush administration's daily "talking points" quashed doubts in U.S. media regarding the extent of America's success in imposing order and democracy in Baghdad. A well-oiled machine of distraction and concealment was at work in Washington. Its Israeli counterpart is operating, with considerable success, in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, albeit with one difference: In the U.S., it was a matter of justifying a war, while here it is a matter of fudging one. The truth behind the inflammatory talk is that hardly anyone in the cabinet or the General Staff is eager for battle. After the failure in Lebanon two years ago, the ministers, like the generals, do not want to get caught up in another imbroglio in which they would end up with casualties being linked to their names. Gaza is not Lebanon: Hamas is less skilled than Hezbollah, even if it is working to close the gap. The IDF in 2008 is better trained, too, and its plans are more orderly and detailed than those of 2006. However, there are basic problems that have yet to be solved. The most important of these is the gap between the public's expectations and the operational ability in action. According to the most optimistic IDF assessments, it would take many months of physical presence on the ground in parts of the Strip to bring about a significant decrease in the attacks on the Negev. The army is not certain whether the public or for that matter the government can muster such patience, when it is obvious that the prolongation of any fighting will cost the lives of many soldiers. We can occupy parts of the territory, says a senior officer, with the aim of gradually reducing the rocket fire and preventing the strengthening of Hamas, which relies on weapons being smuggled in from Sinai. "However, under what arrangement will the territory be transferred into responsible hands? An answer of 'It'll be okay' will no longer suffice in this round." Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi will carry out any mission he is charged with, but he is too cautious to repeat the mistake made by his predecessor Dan Halutz, who urged the government to launch a war without clarifying its aims. Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin is blunter in his criticism of the flaws in the Egyptian initiative, but it is his job to focus on the half-empty glass. The effort that will be needed in the wake of an offensive, to stabilize Gaza, is not at the top of his list. The only senior administration official who has been articulating a consistent and forceful position in favor of a large operation is GOC Southern Command Yoav Galant. Galant, a skilled, experienced and organized officer, has prepared his command for extensive action. His opinion is also recorded and documented at every discussion of the subject. The cynics at General Staff are asking themselves whether this isn't the lesson the major general, a graduate of the Prime Minister's Bureau (he served as former prime minister Ariel Sharon's military secretary), learned from the Winograd Committee (which investigated the conduct of the Second Lebanon War). And the political crisis affecting the government cannot be ignored either. Israel's affairs are being run by a divided and quarrelsome administration, the head of which knows that his political end is nearing, while those under him are dreaming of the succession. Right now, the key person when it comes to Gaza is not Olmert, but rather Barak. The prime minister, who has lost all his public credibility, will find it hard to announce a large-scale operation without the defense minister's support. However, Barak is the patron of the tahadiyeh. The defense minister prefers to give the talks at least another week or two, in the hope of achieving a temporary cease-fire. If an agreement is not reached, the pressure on the IDF will increase, but not to the point of having to launch a large-scale offensive. In the meantime, Barak has been diligently visiting every arena of disaster in the Negev, and getting his picture taken at each one. Participants in the most recent cabinet meeting gained the impression that there won't be an operation in the near future, because Barak is opposed. For the time being, Olmert is going along with his defense minister. The question is, what will happen if Barak is forced to walk out of the government, should Olmert reject his demand to resign. Will the prime minister appoint Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz in his stead? After all, Mofaz was the successful chief of staff who led Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002. Bookmark to del.icio.us   Fragile cease-fire Olmert: Gaza cease-fire is fragile, may be short lived. Unbalanced stance Italy FM: EU stance on Israel in past swayed by intolerance.

Read & React Olmert: Gaza truce is Hamas' last chance to avoid major IDF op Responses: 204 ANALYSIS / For Gaza truce architect, Israel chose lesser of 2 evils Responses: 103 Editorial: A lengthy cease-fire is an achievement for Israel Responses: 45 Jerusalem denies services to Palestinian residents over the fence Responses: 76 Rosner's Domain / The Joe Lieberman dilemma Responses: 65 More Headlines 18:20 Barak: Only U.S. can advance Israel-Syria talks 20:39 Israel-Hamas truce takes hold in Gaza 22:01 Head of Lebanese terrorist's village: We're preparing for Kuntar's homecoming Sunday 12:24 Environmentalists win decade-long war against Eilat fish farms 18:53 VIDEO: Hamas TV shows how to abduct an Israeli soldier 19:45 Lithuania bans public display of Soviet and Nazi symbols 15:48 The Joe Lieberman dilemma 14:46 Mother of missing soldier: Hezbollah will kidnap again if Kuntar not returned 17:20 Taxi and truck drivers protest fuel prices, clog main T.A. artery 17:56 Land mine explosion kills two Bedouin children in Sinai 19:06 Report: Human rights activists in Arab world face countless threats 15:10 Four police officers injured in clashes with West Bank settlers 16:11 Social workers to shut down welfare offices over labor dispute Previous Editions Select Day 18 jun 17 jun 16 jun 15 jun 13 jun 12 jun 11 jun 10 jun 09 jun 08 jun 06 jun 05 jun

Special Offers Advertisement Holyland Park Jerusalem Apartment Tower World Class Luxury In the heart of Tel-Aviv The Meier on Rothschild tower Jerusalem of Gold Luxury apartments in Jerusalem's finest location Your vacation starts here Israel Travel Center Guaranteed Lowest Rates Free Hebrew Private Lesson www.iStudyHebrew.com Pardes Institute Summer Sessions http://www.pardes.org.il/ Free the Palestinians from: Corrupt Kleptocracy, Tyrannical Theocracy, Abysmal Anarchy Fattal Hotel Chain Perfectly located hotels on best resorts of Israel. ISRAEL BONDS Build Israel Israel bonds - a multi-purpose way to celebrate Israel's 60th Eldan Rent a Car Israel's leading car rental company offers you a 20% discount on all online reservations Junkyard Junk a car - get free towing nationwide and a tax-deductible receipt

Home | TV | Print Edition | Diplomacy | Opinion | Arts & Leisure | Sports | Jewish World | Underground | Site rules |

Real Estate in Israel | Travel to Israel with Haaretz | Hotels Israel | Restaurants Israel | Tourist attractions Israel | Shops Israel

birthright Israel

Haaretz.com, the online edition of Haaretz Newspaper in Israel, offers real-time breaking news, opinions and analysis from Israel and the Middle East. Haaretz.com provides extensive and in-depth coverage of Israel, the Jewish World and the Middle East, including defense, diplomacy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace process, Israeli politics, Jerusalem affairs, international relations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli business world and Jewish life in Israel and the Diaspora.

© Copyright  Haaretz. All rights reserved