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And the winner is ... By Zvi Bar'el Tags: Hezbollah, Lebanon  The eight Lebanese civilians killed at the beginning of the week in South Beirut's Mar Mikhael neighborhood serve as an important reminder of an issue with which the Winograd Committee report did not deal: what has happened in Lebanon as a result of the war, and whether the developments in the country of cedars were taken into consideration when the Israel Defense Forces went to war. The images portrayed from Lebanon left one feeling that the country was on the brink of a new civil war: burning tires, shots being fired into the air, rumors of snipers on the roofs, uncertainty as to who is firing at whom and heated rhetoric from all the factions that, like tent-pegs, are holding down the tattered fabric of politics in Lebanon. Predictably, Lebanon's governing coalition is accusing Syria of encouraging the riots, while the opposition is accusing Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government of excessive zeal and of being trigger-happy. Hezbollah's official representatives in parliament hastened to demand an investigative commission, which the prime minister has already ordered. But regardless of its outcome, there is no doubt that this event has played straight into Hezbollah's hands. After all, in the Lebanese equation, when the government or one of its branches, such as the army, is perceived as harassing citizens, Hezbollah is the immediate beneficiary. Advertisement And thus, as the Winograd Committee is delineating the portrait of blame and determining Israel's guilt, and against the backdrop of the heated discussion in Israel as to whether Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah has been strengthened or weakened in the wake of his "body parts" speech (in a public appearance this month, he claimed to have the remains of an Israeli soldier killed during the Second Lebanon War), in Lebanon there is no doubt at all: For about two years now, Nasrallah has been managing the country's politics and since the summer of 2006 he has also been responsible for the suspension of the government's activity, the strengthening of Syria's standing, and stabilizing Iran's involvement in Lebanon; he is even to a large extent dictating the relations between Syria and the Arab countries. Two weeks from now will mark the third anniversary of the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. Three years later, after collecting soil samples, auto parts, thousands of documents and recordings of cellular telephone conversations; after interviewing hundreds of people and holding endless conversations with Syrian representatives; after making the significant decision to establish an international court to try the suspects - nothing has happened. Following one election race for the Lebanese parliament, additional people killed for political reasons, a war which cost the lives of more than 1,100 Lebanese - and still every speech by Nasrallah sounds like "the master's voice" in Lebanon. The voice of Prime Minister Siniora is muted and the appointment of a new president will take place only when Nasrallah nods his head. No disarming Hezbollah Nasrallah has an agenda of his own: He aspires to bring back Samir al-Kuntar as well as other Lebanese prisoners serving time in Israeli jails. He committed himself to this goal in April 2006 - and it was in fact this agenda that gave rise to the abduction of the Israeli soldiers three months later. When he admitted in a television interview after the war that he would not have gone to war had he known the results beforehand, he was referring only to the operative side and to the damage the war caused Lebanon. But Nasrallah also understands that without the war and its damages, he would not have succeeded in demonstrating the extent to which his organization has a hold on Lebanon itself. During the course of 2006, a slow and open-ended dialogue had been going on in Lebanon on the question of Hezbollah's status and on disarming it. A further discussion centered on the question of the international court to examine Hariri's death and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which put Hezbollah in the spotlight and marked an international victory for the coalition bloc. (Adopted in 2004, UN resolution 1559 called on all foreign forces to leave Lebanon and for the country's militias to disband, paving the way for a truly sovereign Lebanese government.) At that time, even Nasrallah himself could not have imagined that he would be the final arbiter with respect to the validity and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The seven-point plan Siniora presented at the Rome conference in July 2006, which was supposed to serve as an infrastructure for a truce, was born with especially painful labor pangs - until the last minute, Nasrallah made it clear that he would not agree to the points if they included a provision concerning Hezbollah's disarmament. Only after Siniora changed the provision several times, and finally proposed that there should be no armed force in Lebanon apart from the Lebanese army, without explicitly mentioning disarming Hezbollah - not to mention a date for doing so - did Nasrallah deign to agree. This point would later find its way into Resolution 1701, which in effect states that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will not be able to disarm Hezbollah. For its part, Hezbollah agreed that it would not display its weapons south of the Litani River. This compromise did not do Hezbollah much damage because the organization was able to hold on to its weapons stores in the country's south. The Syrian formula The big question from Lebanon's perspective is no longer how many weapons Hezbollah has and where it is storing them. The war revealed the strategic threat potential held by Hezbollah all too clearly. Another example of this was this week's meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, who were set to discuss the matter of Gaza but mainly talked about the crisis in Lebanon. On the table was the formula based on the Arab states' agreement, whereby a national unity government would be formed in Lebanon on the following basis: 13 ministers for the coalition, 10 for the opposition, and seven ministers of the president's choice. Syria wanted a formula in which each of these three power centers would have 10 ministers in the government - "for the sake of equality," according to Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem. In so doing, he raised the minority opposition to the same level as the majority - but more importantly, the Syrian formula made it easier for Hezbollah to oppose any proposal raised by Hariri's faction, which currently constitutes the majority. Needless to say, the Syrian formula is also Hezbollah's formula and when it was not accepted, the Arab foreign ministers returned home with a watery resolution that talks mainly about the need to continue to seek a diplomatic solution. In fact, the dependent relationship between Syria and Lebanon would most likely not even be solved by peace between Syria and Israel. Syria's interests in Lebanon (like its relationship with Iran) are not contingent on peace or non-peace with Israel. Hezbollah's power structure is not disconnected from the Lebanon war. As Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005 and following the elections two months later, it emerged that Hezbollah had raked in 14 seats (out of 128) in the parliament, as compared to the nine it had won in the 2000 elections, after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. That is, of the 27 seats allotted to the Shi'ites in the 1989 Taif Accords, Hezbollah won only half. Were it only for its political power inside Lebanon, it is doubtful whether the organization would have the same influence as it has in Lebanese politics today. The fact that it is an armed organization, one that can depict itself as the force that defends Lebanon against Israel, is what gives it the tremendous power advantage, but it, too, needs to prove its ability. And that was accomplished by the Second Lebanon War. If there is truth to Nasrallah's statement that he had not expected such a sharp Israeli reaction, believing Israel would act as it had in the past - that is to say, not strike back with a real response and perhaps even start negotiations to release the abducted soldiers - he might well have been left without the threatening leverage he currently holds. This is especially true with regard to the Syrian forces who have left Lebanon and in light of the pressure being applied by the international community to implement Resolution 1559, which includes disarming Hezbollah and thereby forcing Nasrallah to agree to a national dialogue. A year and a half after the war, it is Nasrallah who is holding Lebanon down. He has already obtained his deterrent force against the country of cedars. Bookmark to del.icio.us   Get a job The Interior Minister tells the ultra-Orthodox to find work and enlist in the IDF. Trapped in Gaza An Irish woman and her daughter are stuck in Gaza after Egypt seals the border.

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