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Last update - 10:41 20/10/2007 What makes a foreign minister great? By Avi Primor Tags: Henry Kissinger "Diplomacy" by Henry Kissinger, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 912 pages, $22; translated into Hebrew by David Ben-Nahum, Shalem Press, 911 pages, NIS 120 Henry Kissinger's brother, Walter, was once asked how it was that he, who is one year older than Henry, spoke unaccented American English, while his brother still had a heavy Bavarian accent. His answer: Henry just doesn't listen. In his monumental book "Diplomacy," Henry Kissinger shows that even if he does not listen, his intellectual curiosity knows no bounds. His razor-sharp analysis of the last four centuries of history and diplomacy gives historically informed readers a rare insight into developments and circumstances, even if this insight is not always impartial. Kissinger is not only knowledgeable and opinionated; he has an ego as well. While sailing through history, he always attributes great importance to the second-in-command, who supposedly had a greater influence on policy than the sovereign to whom he answered. For Kissinger, the hero is Richelieu, not Louis XIII (who is barely mentioned in the book); Metternich, not Emperor Francis I; Bismarck, not Emperor William I, and so on. I would almost add, Kissinger, and not Richard Nixon. Advertisement This may be why Kissinger has difficulty with history-makers such as Catherine the Great of Russia or Frederick the Great of Prussia, whom he hardly mentions in the book. While analyzing Russia's historical failures, Kissinger writes: "Neither imperial nor communist Russia ever produced a great foreign minister ... its foreign ministers ... lacked the authority to design long-range policy." In other words, to its misfortune, no Russian government had a Kissinger of its own. Diplomacy trumps war And what does a foreign minister need in order to shape policy and be "great"? According to Kissinger, the answer is "the ability to define long-range objectives," and he provides numerous examples. Discussing the war in Korea and the clash between then president Truman and General MacArthur, whom he considers a genius, he writes, "If diplomacy were to be prevented from defining war aims, every conflict would automatically become an all-out war." In other words, even the greatest military genius is worthless without a diplomat behind him to define the war's goals. In general, Kissinger does not refer much to military accomplishments or failures; he considers these to be in any case the outcome of diplomacy, which takes the leading role and uses the army as a tool in the pursuit of its own goals or follies. In this context, Israeli Foreign Ministry personnel will enjoy reading what Kissinger thinks of non-professional diplomats, those we usually refer to as "political appointees." This is how he describes the man who served as the U.S. ambassador in Moscow just before World War II: "Though [Joseph] Davies was an investment banker, hence in communist eyes an arch-capitalist, he had developed the propensity of most American envoys ... especially of non-career diplomats ... to turn into self-appointed spokesmen for the countries to which they are accredited. Davies' book about his ambassadorial adventures had parroted Soviet propaganda on every conceivable subject, including the guilt of the victims of the purge trials." Kissinger's views on sound policy are evident in the respect he feels for his hero, Cardinal Richelieu, who invented raison d'etat (national interest) as a value superior to all others, including the ideology and interests of the church he headed. Of this Kissinger writes: "The success of the policy of raison d'etat depends above all on the ability to assess power relationships. Universal values are defined by their perception and are not in need of constant reinterpretation; indeed they are inconsistent with it." He writes in the same spirit of the United States in later periods. Kissinger is no great fan of presidents like Woodrow Wilson, who tried to pursue an idealistic policy, and he is especially critical of Franklin Roosevelt for falling into Stalin's traps. He quotes from Roosevelt's reports to his friend Frances Perkins: "Winston [Churchill] got red and scowled, and the more he did so, the more Stalin smiled. Finally, Stalin broke out into a deep, hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it was then that I called him 'Uncle Joe.' ... From that time on our relations were personal ... The ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers." Another report quotes Roosevelt as saying: "I may say that I 'got along fine' with Marshal Stalin. He is a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people ... very well indeed." No wonder Kissinger emphasizes Roosevelt's cheery report from the Yalta Conference: "I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace." The reader cannot help but recall Chamberlain's words after the Munich Conference, when he declared of the agreement reached there, "I believe it is a peace for our time." There is no need to spell out what Kissinger thinks of Roosevelt's naivete; on the other hand, he admires most of the American statesmen who, "under the umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine ... could pursue policies which were not all that different from the dreams of any European king ... America's desire for expansion and its belief that it was a more pure and principled country than any in Europe never clashed." All this provides grounds for understanding Kissinger's analysis not only of history, but also of contemporary policy. It is a short enough leap from the policy of Cardinal Richelieu, who forms bonds with both the Protestant kings and the Muslim Ottoman Empire in order to weaken the Catholic giant (the Austrian Empire), to Kissinger's own sacrifice of the Taiwanese ally in exchange for a growing closeness with the Chinese arch-enemy, in order to weaken the Soviet giant. Little mention of Israel Unlike Kissinger's book "Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises" (2003), which dealt with the Yom Kippur War and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, "Diplomacy" makes little mention of Israel. It is as if the author were declaring that when it comes to policy-shapers, Israel is not a factor in the debate. This is especially conspicuous in his detailed account of the Suez war, which we call the Sinai Campaign (1956); the account focuses on the crisis in the relationship between the United States, France and England and on its consequences for the West's relations with the Soviet Union. Israel is mentioned only in passing, as a tool that operated according to the instructions and needs of the European powers. However, a few remarks that do not relate to Israel might nonetheless give Israeli readers something to think about. In discussing Germany's mistakes, especially with regard to Russia, Kissinger writes: "Humiliating a great country without weakening it is always a dangerous game." This sentence might prompt us to have certain thoughts about the Middle East, from a number of angles, but it might also make us think of Kissinger himself, who blocked the Israeli army's way to Cairo at the end of the Yom Kippur War and thus wisely prevented Israel from humiliating the Egyptians. Analyzing Europe's deterioration in the lead-up to World War I, Kissinger writes: "The diplomats on both sides were silent ... because nationalistic politics in each country made them afraid to challenge their military establishments." Elsewhere he disparages the statesman who puts his trust in public opinion polls and ratings, whom he describes as "the political figure who desperately seeks to determine what the public wants, yet ends up rejected and perhaps even despised by it." Sound familiar? And when he writes of imperial Germany after Bismarck, taking it to task because "They had forgotten Bismarck's dictum: 'Woe to the leader whose arguments at the end of a war are not as plausible as they were at the beginning,'" the Israeli reader cannot help but think of the Second Lebanon War. The paucity of references to Israel in the book is understandable in light of the country's tiny place within the broad panorama Kissinger lays out for us. More puzzling, however, is the fact that even the word "Jew" is barely used in this hefty volume, and even then not in any context of substance. All through the detailed description of how matters developed in Europe, and especially in Germany, between the two world wars and during World War II, the Jewish issue is never once raised. If the word "Jew" appears, it is only in the context of 2 secondary anecdotes. Beyond brilliant analyses, the book offers several surprises for those who know history from their school textbooks. Kissinger is not very fond of France, to say the least; and still, contrary to accepted opinion, he does not include it among the parties guilty for the policy of appeasement. He believes that the United States is partly to blame for this policy, and that the primary culprit is Britain. France bore most of the burden of World War I. Its chief of staff, Ferdinand Foch, was commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, and France also paid most heavily in terms of casualties and economic destruction. And still the English governments of the 1920s and 1930s decided that victorious France had become too strong, and that it must therefore be weakened as though it were still under Napoleon's rule. Hence the need to appease Germany while avoiding an alliance with France at all costs, a fact that pushed the latter to the defeatist policy of the Maginot Line. Kissinger may not be a fan of the French, but this is precisely what makes his admiration for two French figures so interesting. One is Richelieu, whose image runs through the entire book; the other is General Charles de Gaulle. Kissinger describes how he first met de Gaulle when he accompanied Nixon on his visit to Paris in 1969: "Somewhat awestruck, I approached the towering figure" (this is the same de Gaulle who two years earlier had changed France's pro-Israeli policy). Another surprise to those who know history from textbooks is Kissinger's belief that Stalin never considered East Germany an independent international entity. He always treated it worse than the other satellite states he had subordinated in Eastern Europe, intending to use East Germany as a bargaining chip with the West. It should be remembered that "Diplomacy" was written some three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is why Kissinger focuses on trying to understand future developments and mainly tries to give advice to American policy makers. He writes: "One of the most difficult lessons America has yet to learn is that nations cooperate for long periods only when they share common political goals, and that American policy must focus on these goals rather than on the mechanisms used to reach them." National interests, he adds, should never simply be "assumed away." Still, as Prof. Shlomo Avineri notes in his fascinating and important introduction to the Hebrew edition, Kissinger in 1994 did not predict the problem of Islamic terrorism. Strange, since Al-Qaida in its present format was established in 1991, in the wake of the first Gulf War. Finally, one cannot but voice a few words of criticism. Obviously, Kissinger is very accurate when it comes to historical details and figures, and still he makes a small historical mistake. He says that in 1762 the Russian army was at Berlin's gates, but then the czar died, and his heir called the troops back to Russia. In fact, it was not the czar but the czarina, the empress Elizabeth, and the Russian armies were standing not at the entrance to Berlin, but inside the conquered city, while the Prussian king Frederick the Great was already contemplating suicide as he fled. When the czarina died, she was succeeded by her nephew, Peter III, who was insane and idolized all things Prussian; he therefore ordered the army to withdraw from occupied Prussia, immediately and for no reason. Kissinger mentions this anecdote in order to describe the bizarre atmosphere in Hitler's bunker at the end of the war. On April 12, 1945, Goebbels burst into the bunker, shouting with joy, as he informed Hitler that Roosevelt had died. Now Berlin, he said, would relive the miracle that had occurred after Elizabeth's death in 1762. In addition, there are numerous and unnecessary repetitions in many parts of the book. In conclusion, I wish to echo what Avineri says in his introduction: "The Israeli reader will find in this book a wealth of material, combining profound and varied historical knowledge with an understanding of reality, with all its limitations and necessities. Kissinger stands at the intersection of intellectual insight and an impressive capacity for practical execution. Even those who do not always agree with his claims and analyses will inevitably be impressed by the breadth of the book and by the combination of theory and practice, which few statesmen can claim." Avi Primor is director of the Trilateral Center for European Studies at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, and former Israeli ambassador to the European Union and to Germany. Bookmark to del.icio.us   Message from space A newly-launched Israeli spy satellite sends Iran a very clear message. Gravediggers' plight Even getting buried in the Gaza Strip has gotten more complicated these days.   1.   Kissinger is a war criminal 13:42  |  ILFESSO 20/10/07   2.   On the 9/11 he was on his way to be heard in a N.Y. Law of Court 16:32  |  HT 20/10/07   3.   agree #1 16:56  |  peter 20/10/07   4.   Rathenau 17:28  |  ROB OF MELBOURNE AUS 20/10/07   5.   "Little mention of Israel" 18:25  |  John Isenhower 20/10/07   6.   Kissinger Almost Sold Israel and He sold Vietnam Out 19:38  |  ralphsrant1 20/10/07   7.   Kissinger admires cardinal Richelieu? 20:00  |  Mark B, 20/10/07   8.   Kissinger 21:10  |  ralphsrant1 20/10/07   9.   A Lengthy Read but Worth It 23:15  |  Davethediplomat 20/10/07   10.   A Lengthy Read but Worth It 23:15  |  Davethediplomat 20/10/07   11.   Kissinger betrayed Israel in Yom Kippur war 23:29  |  e.m 20/10/07   12.   # 11, now that is wild 03:56  |  David 22/10/07   13.   I agree with the consideration of h Kissinger as a criminal 23:00  |  philosopher 21/01/08

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