Palestinian security personnel loyal to Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas have put up dozens of roadblocks throughout Ramallah in recent days. Their orders: arrest Hamas activists.

The Preventive Security force in the West Bank, which stood at the forefront of the short campaign Yasser Arafat ordered against Islamist organizations in the mid-1990s, is back with a vengeance.

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The outpouring of energy by the security organizations affiliated with Fatah is directly linked to concerns in the PA that Hamas is planning a series of terrorist attacks and assassinations against senior figures in the West Bank -- to complement its swift takeover of the Gaza Strip. In Israel, experts remain skeptical that any such attempt will be made.

The structure of Fatah in the Gaza Strip was rotten to he core, sources in the defense establishment say, and the organization nearly collapsed under its own weight the minute Hamas began applying pressure. In the West Bank, Fatah is showing some signs of recovery, partly because there is a recognition that the organization has reached some sort of historic juncture.

Moreover, Hamas has suffered some serious blows in recent years, all delivered by the IDF and the Shin Bet, leading Israeli sources to the conclusion that it is unlikely to be in a position to carry out a successful assault against Fatah in the near future.

For the first time in years, senior PA officials and heads of the security organizations in the West Bank are speaking in different tones. The Second Intifada against Israel is over, they say. Now, Fatah must focus its energy against its domestic threat, Hamas.

It is to this end that it is possible to renew ties with Israel, which is also doing its part: it is releasing prisoners affiliated with Fatah, allowing the transfer of arms from Jordan and Egypt for the PA's security forces, and has acceded to Abbas' secret request, not to allow the opening of the Rafah crossing in the southern Gaza Strip.

Furthermore, there has been another significant development in the ties between Israel and the PA, although it has been kept under wraps from the media. For the first time in years, the Shin Bet is making use of intelligence it receives from the PA's security organizations, information it uses against terrorists in the West Bank.

But, as usual, for the PA, Israel never does enough. As far as Fatah is concerned, Israel must do more to bolster Abbas and his prime minister, Salam Fayad. Inside the PA, there is a debate on what precisely Israel should do. For example, while Abbas and Fayad recite over and over the demand for negotiations, many senior Fatah officials argue that political talks with the Olmert government on a final-status agreement can only be harmful for the Palestinians. They say that the prime minister is unable to give any more than what was offered to Arafat during the Camp David summit in 2000, and Abbas cannot accept any less.

These senior officials say that negotiations with Israel is a Palestinian excuse, a permanent alibi, for the failure of the PA to carry out genuine change in the West Bank.

Similarly, they point to the fact that the problem of fugitive militants, mostly in Nablus, has still not been entirely resolved -- since the immunity pact signed with Israel does not include all the Fatah militants. IDF forces continue to operate in Palestinian towns at night, and roadblocks have not been lifted.

"The Palestinian public is not very excited about the embrace of Israel by Fayad and Abu Mazen [Abbas]," a Palestinian analyst explains. "From our point of view, Israel is still the real enemy. Not Hamas. What is needed now is a departure of Israel from the Palestinian cities, a lifting of the roadblocks... and the release of more prisoners is needed.

"On the economic front, wages to PA officials affiliated with Fatah does not help much... If genuine change is desired, unemployment must be lowered, and so must poverty, and to this Israel can contribute by allowing workers entry into its territory."

But, the same analyst says that "the situation in the organization [Fatah] is so bad, that only if Arafat himself rises from the grave will Fatah make a comeback."

This skepticism is shared in Israel. While there is recognition that change has occured, after so many disappointing experiences since the Oslo agreements, the extent to which Israel is willing to take risks is still very limited.