Negotiations aimed at freeing Corporal Gilad Shalit from captivity in Gaza resumed this week, a year after the attack on an Israel Defense Forces outpost in Kerem Shalom that ended in his abduction and the death of two other members of his tank crew. The negotiations have been conducted lackadaisically, even as Israel embarked on a military campaign to recover two soldiers kidnapped to Lebanon, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. All three are still in the enemy's hands, and signs of life have been received only from Shalit, in an audiotape released by his kidnappers on Monday.

Substantively, the tape did not change the negotiations. It had an emotional impact on the Israeli public and, via its reflection in the media and public opinion polls, on government decision-makers. But the fundamental issues remain the same. Despite the rhetoric, states maintain a price list. They are ready to risk losing soldiers in a military mission aimed at recovering an abducted person, and they are sometimes even willing to risk the chance that the captive himself will be wounded or killed in the rescue attempt. But they refuse to give kidnappers diplomatic concessions.

The deal now being concocted is therefore one of "prisoners in exchange for prisoners." That is what happens after wars, in prisoner exchanges and spy swaps, and therefore, a release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel will be necessary to free Shalit. But in this deal as well, the boundaries are clear: Palestinians and no one else - especially not Israeli Arabs convicted of security offenses.

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In the talks held by Ofer Dekel - the prime minister's envoy on this issue - with Egypt and the Palestinians, Israel also clarified that it would not deviate from the formula set two decades ago in the so-called "Jibril exchange" - one Israeli for 450 Arabs. Despite the seeming propaganda benefits entailed in this equation, it is no source for national pride: It encourages additional attacks and kidnappings, due to the knowledge that in the end, Israel will give in and release hundreds - or, cumulatively, thousands - in exchange for its civilians and soldiers.

The Dekel talks determined that Israel would release 350 prisoners upon Shalit's arrival in Egypt and another 100 upon his return from Egypt to Israel. However, no agreement has been reached on the identity of these prisoners. The kidnappers naturally want the release of those whom Israel considers responsible for acts of mass murder and other atrocities, and who are serving corresponding sentences. Israel is insisting that it will only release those convicted of less severe crimes, or whose crimes were committed relatively long ago, or who will soon finish serving their sentences anyway.

The government must fight the temptation to satisfy those in the public and the media who seek immediate gratification and transient headlines. The government is responsible for all IDF soldiers and all the country's citizens, and the gain of Shalit's release could easily turn into a loss, in the form of a fatal attack. There will presumably be more attacks in any case, but the government must work to reduce their number and bolster the moderate Palestinian forces; otherwise, the kidnappers and their organizations will be strengthened.

The decision to release 250 prisoners affiliated with Fatah, independent of the Shalit deal and before it has even been finalized, was a correct one, and it should be followed by other, similar gestures. Regarding the Shalit deal itself, Israel must continue to demand that the price be lowered. In principle, the deal is justified if there is no military alternative. But those who are willing to pay any price are liable soon to find themselves facing ever more negotiations and dilemmas of this nature.