In his article "Missiles Against Metal Pipes" (Haaretz, May 14), Reuven Pedatzur dismisses the development of an anti-Qassam defense system for technological and financial reasons, as well as on principle. He feels it is doubtful whether it is even possible to solve the technical problem of intercepting Qassam missiles. Beyond that, he suggests, even if the technical challenges can be overcome, the project will be more expensive and take longer than has been promised by Rafael, the Armament Development Authority, and in general, the whole idea of a missile to intercept flying "metal pipes" is fundamentally mistaken.

Pedatzur had reservations about developing a defense system against the Scud missiles, and offered amazingly similar reasons. In a long and detailed study he published in 1993, he cast doubt on the technical ability of the State of Israel to develop such a defense system, and even predicted that if it could be done, the system would not be operational before 2010, and at a cost so high that the Israel Defense Forces would be unable to acquire other weapons systems.

As we know, the Arrow system, which was the target of Pedatzur's criticism in those days, was successfully tested, was deployed operationally in 2000, and did not prevent the Israel Defense Forces from acquiring advanced F-16 planes, Merkava 4 tanks, sophisticated UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and many other modern weapons systems. His present prophecies are likely to be no more accurate than those of 15 years ago. The truth is that there is no technical obstacle to developing a system to intercept Qassams. Moreover, the development will be concluded within a few years, and the cost of the system will be reasonable relative to the country's resources, as well as to other alternatives.

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These "metal pipes," which we tend to make light of, have placed the western Negev under a state of siege, and caused everyday life there to halt, school to be canceled, people to flee and damage to property. Above all, they are wounding and killing people. If defense from them is neither possible, cheap nor worthwhile, we have to ask what the alternative is: to evacuate Sderot, and perhaps in the future Netivot and Ashkelon as well? To reoccupy the Gaza Strip? Or to sit by idly and abandon the residents of Sderot and the western Negev to their fate?

The petty calculation of the cost of the intercepting missile is interesting as a math exercise, but is of no significance when compared to the cost of the alternatives. Yes, an anti-Qassam missile will not be cheap, but what would be the cost of a campaign to occupy Gaza? According to the press, the Israeli government has allocated NIS 7 billion to the IDF for rehabilitation and for renewing stockpiles that ran out during the Second Lebanon War. At that price, which certainly will cover only part of the war's costs, it would have been possible to develop seven defense systems against the Qassams, as well as against Katyushas from Lebanon, and to produce thousands of defensive missiles.

The argument that the Palestinians can beat us in the arms race of Qassams versus defensive missiles ignores the situation on the ground, and the relative financial and technological resources of the two sides. The Palestinians have factories for manufacturing Qassams, but Israel has much larger, more sophisticated and faster factories. If this is an arms race, there should be not even a shadow of a doubt as to who will have the upper hand.

The residents of Sderot and the western Negev deserve protection from Qassams, just as the residents of the North deserved protection from the Katyushas last summer. The State of Israel has an obligation to protect the lives and the property of its citizens, and we can only regret mistaken assertions that are published and provide excuses for the members of the Israeli government who have not done their duty until now.

The writer was the head of the Homa ("Wall") anti-missile defense program in the Defense Ministry.