Had Ehud Olmert displayed last summer an iota of the wisdom and judgment he is exhibiting during the struggle for his political career, the prime minister would have saved the Israel Defense Forces and the Israeli people the heavy losses and serious damage caused by the Second Lebanon War. However, Olmert's energetic handling of the mini-crisis in Kadima does not in any way diminish his direct responsibility for the serious crisis that occured on the northern border. His success at dousing the budding uprising in the coalition does not lessen the responsibility of its members for the implications of the continued presence of the prime minister and defense minister in their offices.

The deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, who until Wednesday was seen as the natural successor to Olmert, opted for a secure spot on the fence. It could have been expected that immediately after the release of the Winograd Committee's severe report, Livni would have rallied Kadima's members to quickly replace Olmert. Instead, she made do with a call for the prime minister's resignation, and in the same breath announced that she would stay in his cabinet and do nothing to remove him. The rest of Kadima's ministers, who consider themselves candidates for the party's leadership, lined up as one behind the prime minister.

It is unfortunate that the vice premier, Shimon Peres, joined the choir of ministers holding on to the bizarre argument that a leader who directed such a failed war is the right person in a post where every day a decision could be made to go to war again. According to the Winograd report, Peres was the only one among the ministers who did not behave like a rubber stamp to the plans the IDF presented, and he warned that the plan put forth by then chief of staff Dan Halutz for an offensive against Hezbollah seemed "myopic, routine and expected." The veteran statesman recommended to look into the broader context of the operation in the North and respond in a creative way, without overestimating Israel's power.

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In response to the Winograd Committee's question on why he chose to support the decision to adopt the chief of staff's plans, even though he believed the decision to go to war was mistaken, Peres said he was concerned that his opposition would be interpreted as rebellious. This excuse was unacceptable in July 2006 when Olmert went to war. It is similarly unacceptable now when the majority of the party's members allow Olmert to stay at the wheel for the next war - when we are faced with the Iranian nuclear threat and a possible deluge along the northern border, in the occupied territories and on the Syrian front.

The Winograd report confirms the advantage inherent in Peres' enormous experience. The order of the day is to stabilize the political system after Olmert is removed. That is the double challenge facing Peres. He must have the courage to bring the tenure of the prime minister to an end, and only then take on the temporary leadership of the country.