Beyond the harsh criticism of the three main leaders of the last war, the Winograd Committee sharply criticized Israel's government, the supreme civilian body responsible for supervising the army, its operations and its generals. In the chapter on the government's functioning, the committee members wrote: "The whole government, and each one of its members, decided hastily, without being presented with figures and assessments that clarified the meaning and implications of their decision, on an intense and immediate military operation ... without requesting a formal discussion on it." The committee's conclusion is short and harsh: "The Israeli government and all its members did not act with the necessary consideration, caution and responsibility."

Regarding the composition of the government, the committee's criticism becomes even harsher: The Olmert government includes three former defense ministers. One of them, Shimon Peres, previously served as prime minister and foreign minister; the other two, Shaul Mofaz and Benjamin Ben Eliezer, are retired generals who should understand the significance of the army's actions. The government also has ministers with rich security experience - Avi Dichter, Rafi Eitan and Gideon Ezra - and ministers like Prof. Yuli Tamir, who should have internalized the concept of "civilian oversight" over the military. Despite this, there is a sense that the government acted blindly. It seems its members' insight was overlooked and muted by the poisonous charisma of the previous chief of staff.

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In order to understand the depth of the current government's failure, a comparison should be made between it and previous governments that faced war, or the question of launching a war. There are several such examples, such as the internal opposition that emerged within the Begin government during the first Lebanon War. Ministers such as Zevulun Hammer, Mordechai Zipori and especially David Levy tried to block Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who was no less authoritative and charismatic than chief of staff Dan Halutz.

'The Jew' from the government complex

But the most prominent and clear example of this is the government of Levi Eshkol in May 1967, after the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez Canal. The Eshkol government was a clear-cut civilian government. Its ministers were not retired generals (apart from Yigal Allon and Moshe Carmel, who had retired from the army many years earlier). Their image was anti-militarist. Ministers such as finance minister Pinchas Sapir, education minister Zalman Aran, tourism minister Moshe Kol and religion minister Zerach Warhaftig were perceived as symbols of the Diaspora, and not as representatives of the fighting, native-born Israeli sabra. Occasionally, Israel Defense Forces generals would arrogantly, mockingly refer to them as "the Jews."

Facing them was an esteemed and authoritative chief of staff. His name was Yitzhak Rabin. His solid position in dealing with the government stemmed from several factors: The ministers saw him as a thorough, calculated, careful and cautious chief of staff. Eshkol, as defense minister, granted him broad authorities and turned him into a "kind of acting defense minister," as Ami Gluska wrote in his book, "Eshkol, Issue a Command!" (Ministry of Defense Publishing, 2004).

Another key factor was the status of the general staff Rabin built up around him. It included acclaimed generals such as Sharon, Ezer Weizman, Dado Elazar, Israel Tal and Mati Peled. They had firm positions, and were able to express them in all the military forums. In this respect, there is a huge abyss between this general staff and Halutz's mute body, about which the Winograd Committee wrote several harsh and worrisome things. Unlike Halutz, Rabin understood that a good commander must encourage his subordinates to express independent views. There is nothing more pathetic than nurturing "yes men."

After the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez Canal, and especially after the closure of the Straits of Tiran, a serious clash developed between the government and the military. Rabin asked the government several times to launch a war, and the ministers, led by Eshkol, argued that all the political options must be exhausted. They were convinced this was the government's political and moral role.

Warhaftig, who was a very smart and sharp person, wrote in his memoirs that after Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, "we were on full war alert. Moreover, according to the assessments of our senior military officials, we could be certain of victory. At the meeting of the ministerial committee on defense affairs on May 28, 1967, I concluded that I had complete confidence in the military assessments of senior IDF officers, and I did not doubt even for a moment their words that we were ready to strike a decisive blow against Egypt. Nevertheless, I still suggested postponing a military attack. I am in favor 'of a people that dwells alone,' but do not rush to be a 'people that fights alone.'" (from "Hamishim Shana Veshana, Pirkei Zikhronot," Yad Shapira Publishing, 1998)

Reining in the noble steeds

The height of the confrontation occurred in the general staff bunker the day Warhaftig made these remarks. Eshkol explained to the angry generals the significance of the government decision not to begin a war immediately: Members of the international community were willing to resolve the problem of the Straits of Tiran, the preparations of the "maritime powers" to organize a naval force to pass through through Egypt were at their peak, and if there were no international operation, the U.S. would act on its own. Eshkol stressed that in this situation, "beginning a war is not logical from a political, diplomatic and moral perspective," and asked the members of the general staff for "political and military maturity."

The generals' response was harsh and critical; never had Israeli generals said such things to a prime minister, neither before nor after that time. "Today we sawed off with our own hands our deterrent capability," said Sharon, then a brigade commander on the southern front, adding that the government decision undermined the morale of the people. Later on he used a loaded word: "lobbying." The effort to establish cooperation with the superpowers, he argued, could depict Israel as an empty vessel and a helpless country.

Eshkol's response was forceful. He did not cave in to the generals. "We need to take a deep breath. No one ever told us we were a preventive force," he said. At the end of his remarks he voiced a claim that "particularly angered the IDF generals, who their whole lives had been taught about attacking, about war: 'The deterrent ability must be able to wait and enable the exhausting of all other means.' He concluded his remarks with a pointed question: 'Will we live our entire lives by our sword?'" (Gluska, pages 332-334)

As is known, the government decided on June 4, 1967 to go to war, exactly a week after the clash in the general staff bunker, and the American administration gave the green light. That week Eshkol was compelled to hand over the defense portfolio to Moshe Dayan, the highly regarded general who collapsed in fear during the Yom Kippur War. To a large extent, Eshkol paid a heavy price for his ability to withstand the brutal and insolent pressure of the general staff's "noble steeds."

Today, it would be fitting to compare the functioning of Ehud Olmert as prime minister to that of Eshkol, the firm and tragic figure. Olmert did not succeed in - or did not even try - creating an alternative to the narrow agenda of the previous chief of staff, who saw the world only through the sights of a fighter jet. The prime minister let him lead him by the nose, take over his government and upend the democratic hierarchic order: instead of the government controlling the army, the army controlled the government. The fact that the prime minister and his cabinet abandoned their fundamental task as members of the supreme political forum was a key and crucial condition for the terrible failure of the Second Lebanon War.

The author is head of Land of Israel studies at the University of Haifa.