Had the Winograd Committee refrained from saying harsh things about the personal responsibility of the prime minister, defense minister and former chief of staff, its partial report would have been pushed to the margins of the headlines. The profound and well-known flaws in Israel's decision-making processes have never interested either the public or the decision-makers themselves. In fact, previous commissions of inquiry have also been far more successful with respect to implementation of their personal recommendations than with respect to implementation of their systemic-institutional recommendations, of which most traces have disappeared.

The main thrust of the Winograd report is the necessity of formulating suitable ways of making decisions, at least on issues of existential importance, so that what happened last summer will not happen again - namely, so that the state of Israel will not go to war again without, as the report said, a contingency plan or even an orderly discussion that included examining existing plans and considering their advantages and disadvantages.

The Winograd report devoted considerable space to the government, which decided to go to war after a discussion that lasted for about an hour and a half - during which cabinet ministers were presented with brief and concise surveys devoid of details that might have indicated the complexity of the picture. The government, said the report, made its decision unanimously, with no abstentions, acting as a political body expressing support for the prime minister. It "did not explore and seek adequate response for various reservations that were raised" by ministers who had considerable diplomatic and security experience.

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The "very serious failings" that the commission identified cry out if we recall the fact, which is perhaps not known to the ministers, that under The Basic Law on the Army, the government of Israel is the supreme commander of the Israel Defense Forces. By law, the army is subordinate to the entire government, even though the minister who is supposed to be in charge of the army on the government's behalf is the minister of defense. Thus, for example, the chief of staff is subordinate to the entire government. It is the defense minister who nominates the candidate whom he considers worthy of serving in this position, but the government is not required to accept his recommendation.

The commission's observations about the government and its responsibilities are an important element of the report, which deals at considerable length with the key and disturbing question of decision-making processes. Commission member Professor Yehezkel Dror, an Israel Prize laureate who has devoted much of his public and professional life to this issue, made a considerable contribution to the profound analysis of this matter. For many years, Dror has elucidated the grave failures in this area to all of Israel's decision-makers, but without moving them to make any significant change in their conduct.

However, it is no longer possible to leave the commission's demand - for urgent action to create the background conditions that would enable meaningful discussions in the cabinet and other governmental bodies, at least on issues of war and peace - without a serious response. The responsibility for promptly initiating changes in the way that decisions are made and enlisting support for their implementation rests with the prime minister.

The committee recommended establishing a procedure for presenting the government and other official bodies with background material and recommendations that would include situation assessments, aims and alternatives. It proposed "improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges" by means of workshops, symposia and in-depth discussions.

The cabinet will meet this week and will almost certainly resolve to adopt the report's conclusions, but it is doubtful that it will give serious thought to these recommendations. The committee itself was aware of this, noting that even recommendations that are accepted by everyone and approved by the government are usually not carried out. Therefore, it underscored the need to establish clear lines of responsibility and a clear timetable, as well as a procedure to monitor implementation in order "to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel."

Such a decision needs to be made now, as a lesson from the past for the sake of the future - both immediate and distant.