Prime Minister Ehud Olmert vowed Monday night that he would not resign, despite the publication of the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War, which the accused him of "severe failures" in handling the conflict.

"It would not be correct to resign," he said in a brief televised statement from his office, "and I have no intention of resigning."

Instead, Olmert said, he would work to implement the report's conclusions. He called a special cabinet session for Wednesday to begin the work, at which he plans to announce the creation of a special task to oversee the report's implementation, including both government officials and external experts.

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"This is a serious and difficult report. There were mistakes by the decision-makers; we need to start to fix the shortcomings; there's much to be done," he said. "The presentation of the report opens a new chapter of fixing mistakes and learning lessons."

Olmert reiterated his refusal to resign at a meeting of Kadima Party ministers later. "I intend to fight for the continued existence of this government," he said. "If I resign, the certain result will be elections, because there is no possibility of forming another coalition in this Knesset."

The report creates a "very problematic" situation, he admitted, but his resignation, he argued, would merely delay efforts to implement its recommendations.

In private conversations, he added that while he was surprised at the report's severity, he believes that had the committee wanted him to resign, it would have said so.

The panel is considering making personal recommendations - conceivably including one for Olmert's resignation - in its final report, which is expected out in August. Until then, however, Olmert believes that the coalition can survive.

The Winograd Committee's partial report, which covers the first five days of the war, accused Olmert of "severe failures" both in deciding to go to war on July 12 and in managing the early days of the fighting. The prime minister, it said, "bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army."

The report, officially released at a 5 P.M. press conference in Jerusalem, said that Olmert "made up his mind [to go to war] hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him, and without asking for one. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs."

It also censured the premier for failing to "adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations behind Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing."

"All of these," the report concluded, "add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence."

The report also slammed Defense Minister Amir Peretz for being unaware of the IDF's lack of preparedness, which he should have been.

Peretz "did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals," it said. Yet despite this, "he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment."

Overall, the panel found, "his serving as minister of defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges."

Peretz had previously announced that he would leave the ministry in another month.

Dan Halutz, then the IDF chief of staff, was criticized for entering the war "unprepared" and failing to inform the cabinet of the IDF's lack of preparedness. Halutz also failed to "present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions."

Committee Chairman Eliyahu Winograd told the press conference that the war's outcome would have been better had Olmert, Halutz and Peretz acted differently. However, he said, the former army chief bears added responsibility, because he knew that Olmert and Peretz were inexperienced in military matters. Halutz displayed a lack of professionalism and judgment, Winograd said, reacting impulsively to Hezbollah's kidnapping of two reservists on July 12.

Olmert and Peretz, despite their lack of experience, did not request help or question the plan Halutz presented, Winograd added.

Moreover, "some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action," the report said.

The committee also criticized the entire government for having voted to go to war without understanding the implications of such a decision. According to the report, "the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment,' or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level,' or military preparations without immediate military action, so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction."