Beyond the basic controversy over publishing the testimonies given to the Winograd Committee, the real story is the committee's interim report.

The political and military leadership is gripped by tension in anticipation of its release, which is expected toward the end of next week.

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"Waiting for the Winograd report is paralyzing everyone," says a senior IDF officer. "Many things are not moving because everyone is waiting for the report."

The committee said in mid-March that the interim report would consist of personal conclusions regarding Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and former chief of staff Dan Halutz. But although it is about the period until July 17 (the sixth day of the war) and its conclusions are limited to the senior trio, the pressure is clearly felt in the ranks below.

The final report will determine the future military career of quite a few senior officers. Others, who have already retired following the war, hope the committee will help exonerate them, at least partially, from the accusations hurled at them. The interim report will not allay the tension, but is expected to indicate the direction of the conclusions.

"Everyone knows there will be no medals and each of those involved knows he too botched it up," a military source says.

The committee has already said that Halutz is the main subject of half the report. But it is not clear how the committee will allocate responsibility for the failings in managing the war between the Northern Command or General Staff, or who will be deemed negligent in preparing the army for war, Halutz or his predecessors Moshe Yaakon and Shaul Mofaz.

The argument between the Northern Command and General Staff is especially heated. On one hand there is the head of the Northern Command during the war, Udi Adam. He has remained silent so far, but his position was reflected in an interview with his deputy, Major General Eyal Ben Reuven, in Yedioth Ahronoth. Ben Reuven said the command had been well prepared for the war with a plan for taking over the area south of the Litani River.

However, the General Staff threw a spanner in the works by refusing to mobilize the reserves immediately, sending forces to unnecessary missions and seeking victory "symbols" such as conquering Bint Jbeil.

Ben Reuven blamed Halutz, but half his barbs were aimed at his successor, Major General Gadi Eisenkot, and the deputy chief of staff, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky.

The General Staff blames Adam, who was hesitant and unassertive, for most of the failures. On the other hand, Halutz's arrogant dominance prevented the General Staff's senior ground force officers, Kaplinsky and Eisenkot, from turning the war in the right direction.

Kaplinsky also cites Halutz's organizational reform, which neutralized his authority to operate the forces as long as Halutz was at the helm.

This approach is widely supported in the army, as Kaplinsky and Eisenkot are very popular among their subordinates.

Journalists Yoav Shelah and Yoav Limor, whose book on the war (Captives in Lebanon) was published this month, describe Kaplinsky and Eisenkot as the two tragic heroes of the story. They gave Halutz all the right advice, but he wouldn't listen.

Adam told the committee that Halutz misled him. He led him to believe that the plan to take over the region south of the Litani would be carried out in a matter of days, while behind his back Halutz sought for ways to emasculate the plan.

Halutz comes out badly in the committee's report in any case. An article in last week's Yedioth describes Halutz the Harvard student - he's studying there now - and his farewell party. Like he did in the war, Halutz again managed to insult everyone. In the case of some members of the General Staff who had been loyal to him in the war, the article added insult to injury. Not only did Halutz not invite them to his party, he described the General Staff forum as a bunch of backstabbers.

The brigadier generals, whose retirement study grant is $2,000, were appalled to learn that the state is spending $56,000 on Halutz's course in the United States.

Photographs from Halutz's party showed an especially humiliating impersonation of the defense minister, by comedian Eli Yatzpan, before senior IDF officers.