1. In recent days, the media have published conjectures, guesses, estimations and journalistic "information" regarding the Winograd Committee report and the date on which it will be issued. None of these reports were in accordance with the committee's opinion nor were they made on its behalf. There was also some - baseless - information published regarding the opinions of some of the committee members on the issues being addressed by the committee.

2. The committee's partial report on the events of the Lebanon campaign of 2006 will be issued during the second half of April. Along with the classified report, which will be given to the prime minister and defense minister, an unclassified report will be made public.

3. The partial report will include sections that deal with the following topics:

	Advertisement

A. A discussion of the general principles of the committee's work and perception of its role in all that is related to determining findings, conclusions and recommendations.

B. The committee's perception of issues related to inherent justice.

C. An analysis of the period leading up to the campaign, from the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 until the beginning of the campaign itself, as well as general conclusions regarding this period.

D. An analysis of the decision to embark on the campaign, from the abduction on July 12 until the prime minister's address to the Knesset on July 17.

4.The analysis of the period concerning the decisions to embark on the campaign will include three sections:

A. Detailed findings

B. Systemic conclusions

C. Personal conclusions regarding the responsibility of the prime minister, the defense minister and the former chief of staff concerning the decisions leading up to the beginning of the campaign and the manner in which they were made.

D. Systemic recommendations

5. We chose to dedicate a partial report to these issues, as the decisions to embark on the campaign were especially important for the remainder of the campaign, and deal with issues that in our opinion are urgent in terms of implementing conclusions and recommendations. We would like to emphasize that our conclusions in the report do not reflect our position on the entire campaign.

5. Every effort is being made to issue the final report as soon as possible. We view the expeditious completion of the work as very importance, as the final report will deal with issues of the highest importance, in which it is crucial to understand what happened, and above all to identify what must be fixed. The final report will address, among other things, the following issues:

A. An analysis of all aspects of the fighting, including the IDF's principles and issues such as the army's preparedness, the building of the force, its activation, training of officers and perceptions on activating the force.

B. The political leadership's decisions during the campaign, including those related to the conditions for a cease-fire and the fighting in the final two days after the Security Council decision.

C. The relationship between the political and military leaderships regarding the use of military force as part the strategic perception regarding the State of Israel's objectives.

D. The general ethos of Israeli society and how it is connected to the challenges the state faces.

E. The handling of the home front regarding preparedness, integration of all elements, operational perception and activities of the home front and the authorities (while coordinating with the state comptroller's findings).

F. The results of the campaign.

7. In the coming days, the committee will launch its Web site. We have been approached by the public on numerous occasions in the past. We would be happy if the Web site would encourage additional people, who have information regarding the issues under investigation, would contact us.