WASHINGTON - Mordecai Manuel Noah, the first Jewish American consul-general, was sent to Tunisia on a diplomatic mission by President James Madison. The year: 1813. The goal: release of Americans abducted by Algerian pirates. The means: a ransom payment. The United States, weakened by its war against Britain, simply had no other recourse.

It was only at the conclusion of the war with Britain, and in the light of the unease at the shameful capitulation to the Algerians, that Madison asked Congress to declare war against the North African Barbarians. The final victory over Britain was provided by a general named Andrew Jackson from Tennessee. He later became one of the most important U.S. presidents.

Capitol Hill. Dilemma

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On February 28, the leading historian of the Jacksonian era, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., died, at the age of 89. Schlesinger was one of America's most prominent intellectuals of the past 100 years. The conclusions of his research about Jackson and his times shattered beliefs that had prevailed from the end of Jackson's presidency (1829-1837) until the middle of the 20th century. It was not the pioneering American West that shaped the ideas that energized the Jackson administration, Schlesinger wrote, but the more established East, which was progressing toward an urban future - the very East which Jackson ostensibly fought against.

Schlesinger, who was an adviser to President John F. Kennedy and continued to publish seminal books, was a vociferous opponent of the war in Iraq, which, he argued, is "based on fantasy, deception and self-deception." A possible American war in Iran, he wrote, would also be based on the same fantasy and the same self-deception. He described an imaginary conversation with President George W. Bush, in which the president asks him what do about Iraq and the historian replies that he would find an appropriate moment, declare victory, and "cut and run."

Many members of Congress, who have been pondering for weeks how to react to Bush's decision to beef up the American military presence in Iraq, agree with Schlesinger, and think the president has exceeded his mandate and that the time has come to stop him. They face a dual problem: constitutional and political. Does Congress have the right to dictate to the president how to wage a war? And will the public put up with such a diktat? The strength of Congress lies in the power of the purse, and the imposition of policy means damming the flow of funds to the U.S. armed forces. The administration could then claim that the Democratic Congress is not supporting "the soldiers in the field" - but that would be political suicide for a party that wants to occupy the White House in less than two years.

Accordingly, the leaders of the Democratic Party chose winding bypass roads, of dubious effectiveness, to express discomfort with the administration's policy. The new Congress is starting to become aware of the limits of its power. It will not be able to stop the war in Iraq before the president decides on that course of action. The administration, for its part, is signaling that it has also learned a thing or two: This weekend its representatives will take part in talks in which Iran and Syria will also participate. Bush, who in recent years has pursued a policy of force, at times brutal, is shifting to diplomacy. Like Jackson, he too reached a difficult conclusion: It is not always possible to reconcile America's interests with the moralistic approach by which one would like to act.

White House. Optimism

The chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos (Democrat, California), this week offered a Washingtonian version of a possible toughening of the sanctions on Iran. The talk of war, he said, is premature, and not smart. In any event, the American public does not support a military confrontation with Iran, and a great deal more can be achieved by economic means. He suggested that restrictions be imposed on companies that invest in Iran's energy industry.

In the meantime, while he and his colleagues were discussing the sanctions the United States could impose, members of the United Nations Security Council were trying politely to reach agreement on the type of international sanctions that would be applied against Iran. There were differences of opinion, but also unanimity on one thing: The time has come to send another message to the Tehran regime.

The undersecretary of state for political affairs, Nicholas Burns, who is the administration official most deeply involved with the Iranian issue, this week testified before Congress in an optimistic vein. "Just a few months ago, Iran appeared to be riding high," he said. But now, the strategy pursued by the United States "appears to have sparked a divisive debate in Iranian ruling circles about whether to continue a confrontational course or agree to negotiations."

State Dep't. Appointments

Light end-of-season snow greeted Jordan's King Abdullah in Washington. On Wednesday he had an attentive audience and drew applause when he addressed a joint session of both Houses of Congress. A few months ago, he talked about three flashpoints on the brink of civil war: Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. In contrast, Burns referred to "four crises": the war in Iraq, the instability in Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear project, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Beyond U.S. responsibility for stabilizing Iraq, Burns stated, "nothing is more vital to the future of America's role in the Middle East than addressing the challenges posed by the radical regime in Iran."

Burns did not dwell on the connection between the resolutions of each of the crises, which is obvious to everyone even if it's not frequently talked about: Without Iran, things will be harder in Iraq; without Syria, Lebanon will not be stabilized; without progress in the peace process, the Sunni Arab states will find it difficult to be of assistance in the face of the Shi'ite front.

The last adviser of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who spoke publicly about the "linkage" theory, Prof. Philip Zelikow, was this week replaced by an adviser who is well known in Israel, Prof. Eliot Cohen. Cohen's appointment was assailed by spokesmen of the radical left. He was described as an honorary member of the neoconservative community, a simplistic portrayal that does not do justice to the totality of his thinking.

Cohen's latest book, "Supreme Command," deals with the complex relations between the civilian leadership and the military high command, by means of four historical examples: Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion. His arguments are simple and illuminating: True victory on the battlefield is attained precisely when the civilian command is willing to intervene, and also impose its will, on the professionals in uniform.

Cohen was sharply critical of today's civilians, those who sent the U.S. armed forces into Iraq. He supported the war, but wrote of its execution, "What I did not know then that I do know now is just how incompetent we would be at carrying out that task," he wrote in an article.