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Final status in a new era
By Jerome M. Segal

Israel's inability to deal with either Hezbollah's missiles or those from Gaza, makes it likely that some sort of provisionality, perhaps as envisioned in the optional Phase 2 of the road map plan, will be part of any peace process.

The real choice facing Israeli policymakers today is whether to limit negotiations to Phase 2 of the road map. This would mean postponing discussion of Jerusalem and of the refugees, and testing the Palestinians with a state with provisional boundaries. The alternative is to negotiate a comprehensive end-of-conflict agreement with Mahmoud Abbas [Abu Mazen], but subject it to performance-based implementation, moving gradually toward full sovereignty and final borders. This latter approach does not drop any of the phases of the road map, but reorders them, starting with Phase 3 negotiations and then making Phases 2 and 1 part of the implementation process.

Reaching a comprehensive final status agreement at the outset offers new opportunities for building peace:
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Starting with the Temple Mount: While genuine borders might come late in the implementation process, with a full deal in place, it will be possible to immediately begin implementation of the final status provisions for the Temple Mount. Ideally, the treaty would affirm that "sovereignty belongs to God," vest operational control with the Palestinians, and establish an international mechanism to adjudicate disputes. Success here would change the tenor of the conflict and have far-reaching implications for the relations between Islam and the West.

Early movement to address the plight of the refugees: Once an agreement is signed, refugee compensation as well as resettlement could begin immediately. Europe, the United States and the Arab states could open their doors to refugees living in Lebanon who choose those venues. Whatever provision is made for a limited number of refugees to live in Israel would be held for later, cautious implementation. Inside the territories, sustained construction of new communities, with the help of the Arab states, could begin to replace the refugee camps. Movement in this realm, which has been stagnant since 1948, will add significantly to a transformation from despair to hope.

Linking de jure sovereignty to the achievement of de facto control: Israeli recognition of Palestinian sovereignty will gradually expand toward the final borders, but only when (1) the Palestinian state actually exercises a monopoly over Palestinian armed forces, and (2) the state is adequately implementing the end-of-conflict agreement. In effect this approach reverses the road map, moving from comprehensive negotiations, to a State with interim boundaries, and only then, as part of its successful assertion of sovereignty, to the Phase One requirement of dismantling terrorist infrastructure.

The key obstacle to initiating negotiations immediately is the problem of a "two-headed government" on the Palestinian side. Some have maintained that there is no point in negotiating until either Fatah defeats Hamas and exercises control over all of the territory, or alternatively, until Hamas (or the new unity government) accepts the three principles of the Quartet (recognition of Israel, nonviolence and acceptance of previously negotiated agreements). This is put forward as something of a mantra. To the extent that arguments are offered for such preconditions, it is said that (1) otherwise Abu Mazen cannot sign a real peace agreement, and/or (2) otherwise no peace agreement can be successfully implemented. This line of reasoning is wrong on all counts.

First, it should be seen that a peace agreement with Israel offers Palestinian moderates a potential path for bringing Palestine to their vision of a pluralistic society rather than one governed by Islamicists. A peace agreement will bring into being a new state, and with it a constitution and new elections. In that context, moderates may win.

Second, neither eliminating Hamas nor having Hamas accept the Quartet conditions up front is realistic. If Hamas is driven from political power, it will go underground and will ensure that no successor governing body will be able to govern. With respect to any peace process, if forced out of government, Hamas will use violence to undermine any negotiations.

Three, what is most needed today from Hamas is not agreement to the three conditions, but the movement's acceptance that Abu Mazen negotiates for all Palestinians, and its willingness to abide by any negotiated peace treaty, provided that it is ratified by a referendum of the Palestinian people. This is all that Israel needs, and seeking more is either foolish over-reaching or the cynical use of preconditions really designed to block a peace process or thwart the elections results.

Four, the above framework for coherence in governance on the Palestinian side, was already accepted, in principle, when Hamas supported the so-called "prisoners' document" last spring. It is stated in paragraph No. 7 of that document. What is needed is codification into Palestinian law. If Israel wants to avoid the chaos of a Palestinian civil collapse, and if it wants to empower Abu Mazen as a negotiating partner, all it has to do is signal that enactment of this framework into Palestinian law will trigger the start of negotiations and a relaxation of the siege on the Palestinian Authority.

Five, if negotiations do move forward under a coherence in governance framework, it is likely that Hamas will moderate politically. However, if this does not happen, and a peace agreement is signed and supported by the Palestinian public, Hamas will be reduced to minority party status. Importantly, the fact that extending Palestinian sovereignty beyond the initial Phase 2 state, will depend on the new government's having a monopoly of power, will make it extremely difficult, in a post-treaty environment, for Hamas or any other group to maintain themselves as armed forces.

Abu Mazen is the best interlocutor that Israel will ever have. His historic mission is the one that Arafat did not seize: to close the final status deal with Israel. His commitment to lasting peace is genuine. If Israel misses the opportunity to negotiate an end-of-conflict accord with Abu Mazen, not only will it face a wider negotiations gap in the future. It may find that there are no Palestinian moderates of stature left standing.

Jerome M. Segal is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies. He is co-author of "Negotiating Jerusalem" (2000).
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  1.   NOT IN EVIDENCE: "his commitment to lasting peace is genuine" 10:25  |  Pavel 16/02/07
  2.   UNITY FIRST, FINAL STATUS CAN WAIT 10:53  |  indrajaya 16/02/07
  3.   The case for final-status negotiations. 11:02  |  sandra chitayat 16/02/07
  4.   Final status 11:04  |  Choni Davidowitz 16/02/07
  5.   Ridiculous Suggestions 11:11  |  Stan 16/02/07
  6.   Our Great Leaders at it again... 11:25  |  Rufus 16/02/07
  7.   To Sandra chitayat 11:31  |  Y 16/02/07
  8.   More nonsense from resident expert Indrajaya. 11:56  |  Rufus 16/02/07
  9.   Segal is living on a different planet 12:18  |  Jonathan S 16/02/07
  10.   Daydreaming at Israel`s expense 12:27  |  Shalom Freedman 16/02/07
  11.   SECULAR HUMANISTIC PEACE NOW MADNESS ?? 12:29  |  Bill. 16/02/07
  12.   FINAL STATUS IS ALL ERETZ YISRAEL FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE ? 12:35  |  Bill. 16/02/07
  13.   ABBAS LIKE ARAPHAT WANTS THE ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL ?? 12:40  |  Bill. 16/02/07
  14.   To Bill the believer 12:43  |  Rufus 16/02/07
  15.   In Abbas is a moderate then 12:48  |  Gee 16/02/07
  16.   indrajaya goes hyperbolic 12:50  |  Marduk 16/02/07
  17.   About Abbas 13:06  |  Jonathan S 16/02/07
  18.   Our land to arabs - never! 13:33  |  Loise Epstein 16/02/07
  19.   What has Abbas done to show he is a Moderate? 14:23  |  Ronnie Wolman 16/02/07
  20.   Final Status 14:33  |  Baruch 16/02/07
  21.   Israel`s grand chance for national suicide. 14:40  |  Yacov 16/02/07
  22.   Negotiating Jerusalem - from Maryland 14:57  |  Asylum Aleikum 16/02/07
  23.   This Belongs on the Comic Pages 15:00  |  Ben Israel 16/02/07
  24.   Mr.Segal, unfortunately, is not in the government 15:19  |  Yaakov Sullivan 16/02/07
  25.   ndrajaya wants unity in palestine yet does 15:19  |  tommy suharto 16/02/07
  26.   Goal vs. Means 15:26  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  27.   Quartet foolish preconditions 15:27  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  28.   Moderation of Hamas; past, present, and future 15:27  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  29.   This article is so outside the reality , that we wonder why -- 15:37  |  Sal 16/02/07
  30.   No Moderates of Stature Left Standing 15:38  |  Johnny Weintraub 16/02/07
  31.   Lemons Anyone? 15:44  |  Tony Anthony 16/02/07
  32.   Jerome M. Segal 15:57  |  curious 16/02/07
  33.   Close but no Segal 16:00  |  Steven 16/02/07
  34.   F I N A L S T A T U S 16:10  |  Gabe1 16/02/07
  35.   Wake up from your dream 16:11  |  SLAVO 16/02/07
  36.   Goal vs. Means 16:22  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  37.   Quartet foolish preconditions 16:23  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  38.   Moderation of Hamas; past, present, and future 16:24  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  39.   #18 Loise Epstein 16:27  |  Hubal 16/02/07
  40.   For the 1st time a realistic PEACE road map 16:32  |  J.M.Jordan 16/02/07
  41.   Road map ? 16:35  |  Ralph 16/02/07
  42.   BILL #11 16:39  |  OYVEY 16/02/07
  43.   Good article with some flaws 16:54  |  Baz Mann 16/02/07
  44.   28tosefta "Our Father Darwin still lives." 16:57  |  curious 16/02/07
  45.   Tosefta #27 17:00  |  Gabe1 16/02/07
  46.   Hubal 17:04  |  Gbae1 16/02/07
  47.   tosefta hamas do not do "moderate" 17:09  |  flashman 16/02/07
  48.   Tosefta 17:11  |  Zardos 16/02/07
  49.   Islamic Movement calls for 3rd Intifada - Segal delusional 17:12  |  Hal 16/02/07
  50.   As long as we deal with people whose single 17:14  |  Anat 16/02/07
  51.   to tosefta hamas =begin 17:14  |  flashman 16/02/07
  52.   tosefta tells us that assad prefers the golan and peace 17:17  |  flashman 16/02/07
  53.   tosefta "assad pere was sincere" 17:20  |  flashman 16/02/07
  54.   assad pere thought he would like to make peace 17:24  |  flashman 16/02/07
  55.   And many of the responses here are a response to Segal 17:26  |  Yaakov Sullivan 16/02/07
  56.   tosefta and his confused thoughts on france 17:30  |  flashman 16/02/07
  57.   #38 Gabe1 and logic 17:32  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  58.   tosefta has repeated the stale joke umpteen times 17:35  |  flashman 16/02/07
  59.   tosefta "too bad liberation movements do not denounce 17:39  |  flashman 16/02/07
  60.   tosefta the mystery for those of us who are not 17:41  |  flashman 16/02/07
  61.   tosefta" the end goal is to conduct fruitful 17:44  |  flashman 16/02/07
  62.   tosefta and "the prisoners agreement" 17:48  |  flashman 16/02/07
  63.   Gabe1 17:48  |  Hubal 16/02/07
  64.   Fools Gold 17:58  |  Danite 16/02/07
  65.   Segal - how much $$ are you getting from PLO? 18:00  |  Judy 16/02/07
  66.   Begin vs. Hamas (Zardos #47) 18:07  |  Tosefta 16/02/07
  67.   Enough negotiations 18:10  |  Anthony W 16/02/07
  68.   Pay the Debt, Make the Peace! 18:24  |  David Steinman 16/02/07
  69.   What it takes... 18:37  |  Katharina 16/02/07
  70.   The guy must be crazy 18:52  |  Richard 16/02/07
  71.