The agreement signed in Mecca between Hamas and Fatah will not realize Israel's dream. It does not explicitly recognize Israel and there is no mention of ending terror. It greatly reinforces Hamas' grip on the Palestinian unity government in the making, leaves Ismail Haniyeh in the office of the prime minister and gives Hamas - more precisely, its political leader, Khaled Meshal - veto power over the decisions of the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. Ostensibly, the right-wing extremists in the Israeli government can point to the agreement as proof that not only is there no common ground for discussions with Hamas, but in addition, Fatah has accepted this more radical direction.

This simplistic view of the agreement, however, is misleading. Hamas has come a long way along two important roads: The organization is willing to honor - even if it has not promised to implement - the agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the PA with Israel, and it had adopted the international and Arab League resolutions, including the latter's Beirut Declaration of 2002. This resolution can be interpreted as accepting, in effect, all of the Quartet's conditions. Those who honor the international agreements and adopt the Beirut resolution are in any event honoring the Oslo Accords, which include recognition of Israel and an end to warfare against it.

Hamas is also willing to accept the principle contained in the Beirut Declaration, according to which Arab states agree to form an alliance of peace with Israel and to normalize relations with it if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders and achieves a just solution to the refugee problem, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

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It could be argued that this theoretical acceptance must be put to a test on the ground. Indeed, that is the position adopted by the Quartet itself in light of the results of the Palestinian summit. The Palestinian unity government has not yet been formed. When it does, it will be possible to determine whether it intends to break through the political paralysis that is affecting the region.

On the other hand, the agreement allows Israel and the Quartet to begin considering genuine amelioration of the economic boycott on the approximately 3 million Palestinians living in the territories, in an effort to nullify the democratic elections to the Palestinian parliament. Those who believe the boycott was effective because it led to the Mecca agreement must also honor its political byproduct. Those who believe, in contrast, that the Mecca agreement is bad for Israel cannot boast of the effectiveness of the sanctions, if that is their result.

It is, therefore, best to look squarely at the reality that created the Mecca agreement and to hope that it will be translated into a practical and moderate platform for the Palestinian unity government. Meanwhile, it is appropriate to move to a practical step: to ease the sanctions, to permit the inflow of money to rehabilitate the economy and services in the territories, and to hold direct talks with the Palestinian government over the prisoner exchange and begin building a relationship of trust with it. This is not an untenable demand. It is inscribed on the same road map that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will attempt to further this week.