A new study on Iran and its nuclear program suggests that Tehran "is seeking to adopt a policy of nuclear ambiguity." The study, authored by Ephraim Kam and a team of researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, will be presented at a conference on Wednesday on Iran's nuclear program, its implications and options for dealing with it.

According to the study, as Iran formulates its nuclear policy, it will have to decide on one of three options: a) to remain on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons - to avoid developing a nuclear arsenal immediately, but developing the capability to do so on short notice; b) to adopt a policy of nuclear ambiguity - to produce nuclear weapons, but to avoid making their existence public and testing them, in the hope of averting further pressure on Tehran; and c) to produce nuclear weapons, announce their existence and possibly also to carry out a test.

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The study suggests that Iran will prefer the second option "which appears most likely, at least in the first stage."

The third option is the "most problematic one for Iran," say the researchers. The tendency of the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to challenge the international community and establish facts on the ground in nuclear matters, while ignoring international public opinion, and the chance that Iran could be influenced by the North Korean example - these factors may, however, lead to the last, more threatening possibility.

The study also evaluates the chances that a military operation may be undertaken against the nuclear installations in Iran, and concludes that "this is a very problematic and complex operation that involves many risks including an open-ended Iranian response. Moreover, a military operation is not guaranteed. At this stage the political conditions are also not ripe for an operation, so long as the diplomatic efforts continue."

Nonetheless, the report notes that the military option is important and preparations for it should continue because of the pressure it places on Tehran - "in view of the fact that the two states that do not reject this option are the U.S. and Israel."

The report also notes that a nuclear-armed Iran has serious implications for Israel because "for the first time an enemy state will have the technical capability of striking a mortal blow against Israel, particularly in view of the Iranian regime's specific call for the destruction of Israel. In essence, this combination holds an existential threat for Israel."

However, the report states that own must assume that a nuclear Iran will act logically, rationally evaluating the price and risks involved in its actions, and will not act out of religious-ideological motives. If one make this assumption, then one appreciates that Iran's motives for acquiring nuclear weapons "are defensive, [and are to be used] against Iraq in the past and against the U.S. today."

Such an explanation can be added to its strategic goals of achieving regional hegemony and to bolster the domestic position of the Iranian regime.

"It is reasonable to assume that also in the future Iran will opt to retain this type of weapons as a final card to use against extreme threats, and that the elimination of Israel is not considered to be an essential interest worthy of using such weapons."

The report also assumes that the likelihood that Iran will transfer nuclear arms to terrorist organization is minimal.

For Israel, the study's advice is to bolster its means of deterrence. Among other measures, this includes making a clear and convincing message that if Israel is attacked by nuclear weapons, it will still retain a counter-strike capability "with severe consequences." In addition, emphasis should be placed on the likelihood that a nuclear strike against Israel may fail because of the performance of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, which is one of the elements that are meant to ensure that Israel can mount a counter-strike if necessary.