Chief of Staff Dan Halutz's letter of resignation ("I decided to fulfill my responsibilities according to the best traditions and values of my home"), like the prime minister's response ("I regret the resignation"), mark the end of an inglorious series of pretenses thrust upon the Israeli public by those running the state since the end of the second Lebanon war. The truth is that the chief of staff did not decide to fulfill his own ideas of responsibility, but was kicked out by the General Staff, the soldiers, the press and those who conducted the inquiries. And the prime minister, who hesitated to fire him, does not regret his departure, but fears what may follow.

Until not long ago, the prime minister, defense minister and chief of staff were all declaring the war a success, a victory on points, that it changed the regional security situation, and various other statements that became invalid even before being uttered. The chief of staff belatedly understood that he is incapable of restoring public faith in the army, or the army's faith in its commanders, and that this is affecting Israel's deterrent capabilities. The defense minister has not yet understood his part in the business, and he is clinging to his post. The hope that salvation would come from the Winograd Committee, which would decide who should go home and who should not, was always vain. The public has lost faith in its leadership and has even begun to wonder whether the government understood that it was going to war when it decided on a large-scale military operation. There is no way to pretty up this dismal picture.

The new chief of staff cannot be someone who played an active role in building or commanding the forces deployed in the last war, even if his qualifications are otherwise superb. The choice is difficult, but Israel has not been orphaned: There are fine candidates roaming around outside the Israel Defense Forces, including those who conducted the inquiries and generals who left the army due to the natural selection process. One should not conclude from the recent war that the chief of staff must never again come from the air force, or that the defense minister must always be a retired general. A war in which the goals were not clear, a defense minister who does not understand security, a prime minister who relies excessively on the army and fails to set clear goals, and a chief of staff who turned out to be a failure despite above-average capabilities and an excellent track record in his previous missions - these constituted a regrettable but unique cocktail of circumstances. We should learn from this experience, but conducting inquiries is not sufficient, even though Halutz deserves praise for having ordered them.

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Commanding an army involves more than learning and applying lessons. A command shake-up is needed, and not just implementation of the new work plan the outgoing chief of staff prepared for 2007. The new chief of staff must rebuild the soldiers' confidence in their commanders, and those who appoint him must view this as top priority. In the current political situation - in which the prime minister fears for his job and the defense minister is seeking a way to escape from a job he should never have accepted in the first place - everyone must rise above his personal concerns and consider the good of the country when choosing a new commander for the IDF. The new chief of staff should be appointed within days. The army is more than the sum of its soldiers, bombs, missiles and planes, and its rehabilitation depends first and foremost on its commander, and on the spirit he instills in it.