Two events with extensive strategic ramifications have taken place in the past two years: the disengagement and the Lebanon war. Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni served in key roles during both events. On the matter of Lebanon, both admit albeit belatedly - that the results are problematic but that they, of course, are not to blame. They have not been asked to report on the results of the disengagement, possibly because of the media's sweeping support for the pullout.

But at the beginning of the week, the foreign minister admitted, completely voluntarily, that the disengagement has only intensified terrorism. The prime minister, in an interview with the Chinese press, said that from now on, he opposed unilateral withdrawal, noting Israel has completely withdrawn from Gaza, and yet Qassam rockets are fired on Israel from there every day.

Shall one who acknowledges a wrong and leaves that path be forgiven? If they were to prove they learned from the errors of the disengagement. But the decisions made during the Lebanon war show that Olmert and Livni didn't learn anything, and therefore are not fit for posts requiring the skills of statesmen. Before the disengagement they were warned that the results of the bitter and hasty pullout would be an intensification of terror and deepening of the internal rift. But they were not willing to listen. A person who has responsibility for human lives and for the external and internal welfare of a state must not err in such matters.

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And if he has erred (in the disengagement and later, in Lebanon) and the price of the mistake is fatalities and other casualties, that is a sign the political figure is not endowed with the ability to make correct strategic decisions. And if the Qassam fire and the loss of deterrent ability were not enough, a serious result of these mistakes has come to light: As Haaretz reported this week, top Israel Defense Forces officials are noting a rise in religious youths' shirking military service. Since, in the last few years, religious youths have been filling the ranks left depleted by others, this means that the IDF, which is warning of another war, will have fewer soldiers.

As prime minister, Olmert is responsible for the strategic failures in the recent war. He brought the IDF into Lebanon too early, and he discovered it was an all-out war too late. He failed to bring the war deep into enemy territory, thereby allowing the enemy to paralyze a third of Israeli territory, for the first time in the history of the state. He also dissolved the extensive support, especially from the United States, that Israel had at the beginning of the war. When the failures of Lebanon are added to the failures of the disengagement, there should be no doubt, even for the last of Olmert's supporters: He does not have the qualifications to make correct strategic decisions. In other words, he does not have the qualifications to be prime minister.

And just as Livni didn't expect the problems the disengagement would cause, so, too, she didn't understand what took place in Lebanon. Even though she was warned that an expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon would become a defense force for Hezbollah, she viewed the changes in UNIFIL as a valuable political and security achievement.

This week, the head of Military Intelligence, speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, summarized the results of this "achievement": Hezbollah, under the nose of UNIFIL, has almost completely rehabilitated its forces, both in terms of people and weapons. If the IDF were to attempt to prevent the weapons-smuggling, it would end up clashing with UNIFIL. Another "achievement" relates to the bolstering of the UN force: Soldiers from hostile Muslim countries such as Malaysia are stationed on Israel's northern border.

The State of Israel faces strategic decisions with far-reaching consequences, and it can rely on no one to make the right choices. This applies to matters like the Iranian nuclear issue and the divorce papers that Israeli Arabs essentially handed to the state in the form of a document from their official leadership, the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee. And on these matters, Ehud Barak won't save us either. His strategic mistakes in fleeing Lebanon and dealing with the Israeli Arab riots in October 2000, and his failure to overcome the war of terror when it was just beginning, were no less significant than Olmert's mistakes.